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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the most divisive and consequential topic in the field of litigation has been class actions. Partisans on one side argue that the class action device is a critical
enforcement tool that increases much-needed access to justice.1
Combatants on the other side scoff that class actions are tools for
shaking down corporations for settlement payments and attorney’s fees in unmeritorious cases.2 And every year, these combatants square off in the academic literature and in panel discussions, face each other in the federal appellate courts and at the
US Supreme Court, and present competing visions at congressional hearings and before audiences of regulators and judges.
I should know. I am something of a regular on this circuit,
presumably because my academic work leaves little doubt about
where I stand on these issues. In amicus briefing, testimony,
and informal appearances, I am often called on as a designated
voice on the pro–class action side of the debate.3 And, of course,

† Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. With deepest thanks to
Michael Burstein, Risa Goluboff, Deepak Gupta, Michael Herz, Richard Schragger, Anthony
Sebok, Kate Shaw, and Stewart Sterk. All errors are my own.
1
See, for example, Myriam Gilles and Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U Pa L Rev
103, 108–12 (2006).
2
See, for example, John H. Beisner, Matthew Shors, and Jessica Davidson Miller,
Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 57 Stan L Rev 1441,
1442–44 (2005).
3
See, for example, Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Carrera v Bayer Corp,
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there are regulars on the other side of the issue—smart and energetic people who want as passionately as I do to convey their
point of view and convince a broader audience of judges, lawmakers, and ordinary citizens.
The result is loud, and plenty heated. Like so many leftversus-right issues, important new developments—Supreme
Court decisions, government studies, and proposed amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—are greeted with talking points, white papers, and action plans. And, as with other
consequential policy debates, the defenders of corporate interests,
like the US Chamber of Commerce, open their checkbooks and
tap their standby stables of high-powered lawyers and communications professionals. Meanwhile, consumer- and employmentrights organizations that are staffed by dedicated public-interest
lawyers do what they can to man the barricades on the other
side. And on and on it goes.
It is against the backdrop of this infernal din that I hear
Professor John Coffee’s voice. Like a grown-up wading into a
room of red-faced toddlers hurling food at one another, Coffee’s
plea is audible: “Enough!”
It is a distinct voice. For more than thirty years, Coffee has
been our preeminent scholar in the area of class actions. His
work is invoked by both sides in the class action wars.4 For the
embattled trial lawyers on the left—parched and looking to
wring errant drips of validation from Supreme Court dissents or,
worse yet, from Ninth Circuit decisions—Coffee’s fundamental
faith in the class action device is restorative.5 And for the corporate side, Coffee’s relentless focus on endemic agency costs—the
built-in misalignment of interests and the mischief that it begets6—just proves the point that class actions are and will remain tools for extortion.

Docket No 12-2621, *2–4 (3d Cir filed Oct 4, 2013) (authored by Myriam Gilles, counsel
for amici curiae).
4
Compare Gilles and Friedman, 155 U Pa L Rev at 103 (cited in note 1), with
Beisner, Shors, and Miller, 57 Stan L Rev at 1453 n 60 (cited in note 2).
5
See, for example, John C. Coffee Jr, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort
Class Action, 95 Colum L Rev 1343, 1348 (1995); John C. Coffee Jr, The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action,
54 U Chi L Rev 877, 896 (1987); John C. Coffee Jr, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md L Rev 215,
226–27 (1983).
6
See, for example, John C. Coffee Jr, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum L Rev 370, 372 (2000).
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In his most recent work, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its
Rise, Fall, and Future, Coffee puts each side in its place. The
book looks to “present a ‘warts and all’ portrait” of class action
litigation—an account, Coffee tells us, “that has long been missing in the literature, in large part because academics writing in
this area either have been so ideologically committed to the private attorney general concept or so implacably opposed to it”
that they have failed to fully examine its consequences (p 219).7
On the one hand, Coffee argues that “private enforcement of law
through entrepreneurial litigation does litigate complex cases
well (probably better than more resource-constrained public enforcers can do)” (p 219) (emphasis added).8 On the other hand,
this private enforcement is “persistently misdirected” by “fiduciary failure”—the structurally misaligned incentives that lead
“plaintiff’s attorneys to settle cases in their own interest”
(pp 117, 219).9
For Coffee, it is a fundamental feature of class litigation
that lawyers—agents—are barely constrained by their figurehead principals, the named plaintiff clients (pp 1–2). Lawyers
make investments, often large ones, and lawyers decide when
and whether to settle the cases. If it is a virtue of the class device that it can aggregate a large number of small interests—and
that surely is a virtue for Coffee—then a corresponding detriment
is that the named plaintiffs’ interests are too small to warrant
any substantial investment in monitoring the lawyers (p 5).10

7
See also John C. Coffee Jr, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise, Fall, and Future
16 (Harvard 2015):

This book’s position is that both views [liberal and conservative] have some basis in fact. The “liberal” view of the plaintiff’s attorney as a “private attorney
general,” who simply supplements public enforcement, significantly understates
the reality and impact of our entrepreneurial system of private enforcement. Correspondingly, the “conservative” view of the plaintiff’s attorney as a “strike suiter” seems increasingly dated after legislation . . . [but] has substantially raised
the bar for plaintiffs in order to protect defendants from “frivolous” litigation.
8
Coffee also points out that liberals value how the class action device “provides
legal representation to dispersed and small claimants, who could never afford to sue on
an individual basis.” Id at 3.
9
Coffee also states that “[e]ntrepreneurial litigation could be redirected, but that
goal ultimately requires refashioning the incentives that today invite private attorney
generals to grab the low-hanging fruit, often in a manner that benefits mainly lawyers
(and not their clients).” Id at 220.
10 See also id at 5 (“Because no individual class member typically has a fraction of
the economic stake at risk that the plaintiff’s attorney has, the attorney’s actions and
decisions are seldom closely monitored by the class members.”); id at 202 (observing that
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The predictable result of these misaligned agency incentives,
for Coffee, is what he terms “abusive litigation”: the attempt by
lawyers to leverage the scale of class actions to coerce unwarranted settlements (p 122). As Coffee explains, the abusive-litigation
problem is exacerbated by doctrines and practices that magnify
the opportunities for pressing nuisance value settlements
(p 122).11 For example, Coffee points to the “American rule,”
which effectively immunizes plaintiff’s lawyers “from the risk of
cost shifting against the loser” (p 29).12 Freed from worrying
about underlying merit, Coffee reports that plaintiffs’ lawyers
regularly exploit the litigation cost differential created by this
rule to induce settlements of even weak class cases (p 165).13
Coffee also considers the incentives for abusive litigation and
sellout settlements in multiforum class litigation, in which
plaintiff’s lawyers worry that if they do not settle quickly and
cheaply, they “may lose out to others” who will (p 121). And “first
to file” rules, Coffee observes, “give[ ] control to the first attorney
on the scene,” but they also generate opportunities for abusive litigation by “reward[ing] premature filing and slapdash complaints” (p 160). Given these sorts of incentives, Coffee tells us, it
is to be expected that opportunistic entrepreneurs would organize
entire businesses around leveraging the class (or derivative) device “to exploit the nuisance value in cases” (p 122). Thus, “bottom
fisher” law firms, as Coffee calls them, ply their craft through derivative suits designed only to threaten delay for M&A transactions, or through class actions alleging imperceptible injuries on

“the U.S. system has long been characterized by weak monitoring of class counsel and
only limited accountability”).
11 See also Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 122 (cited in note 7):
[S]ome plaintiff’s law firms . . . will seek to exploit the nuisance value in cases[,] . . . [which] may sometimes be based on a favorable litigation cost differential, sometimes on the fact that delay is more costly to defendants than plaintiffs (as in a merger case), and sometimes on the fact that risk-averse
individual defendants would prefer to settle if they can arrange to do so based
on someone else’s money (e.g., the insurer, the indemnifying corporation, or the
party bearing the costs of a nonpecuniary settlement).
12 See also id at 11–12 (observing that the American rule “effectively insulated the
plaintiff, who otherwise would have had to fear that an unsuccessful suit . . . would result in the shifting of defendant’s legal fees against the plaintiff in an amount that might
dwarf the damages the plaintiff was seeking”).
13 See also id at 165 (“[T]he American rule incentivizes the plaintiff’s attorney to
impose costs on the adversary, while economizing on its own costs, knowing that it is
immune from fee shifting. The net result is to encourage weak litigation.”).
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behalf of consumers (p 89).14 And the abusive-litigation problem,
for Coffee, is not consigned to these practice ghettos. The class
device generally confers the power to extort by threatening defendants, in relatively weak cases, with crippling exposure to
risk (pp 122–23).
In Coffee’s view, abusive litigation is a pathology born of
poorly aligned agency incentives rather than an indictment of
class actions themselves:
At the heart of this problem of abusive litigation is not the
availability of the class action, which can be used to assert
both meritorious and frivolous claims, but the lack of any
downside for the attorney/entrepreneur who is deciding
whether to assert a nonmeritorious claim based on its nuisance value. (p 122)
That brings Coffee to his central claim in Entrepreneurial Litigation: “Reform requires that the merits need to matter more”
(p 122).
To ensure that plaintiffs’ counsel make investment decisions
based on case merit rather than on exploitable cost asymmetries,
Coffee would have lawyers assume a measure of financial responsibility for the fees and expenses incurred in unmeritorious actions (pp 165–66).15 Toward these ends, Coffee proposes adopting
14 See also id at 89 (describing “bottom fishers” as attorneys who “d[o] not litigate
actively, [do] not conduct discovery, file motions, or take depositions,” but rather “just
wait[ ] for defendants to make a settlement offer”).
15 Coffee also discusses other ways in which we might try to generate incentives for
lawyers to invest more time and energy in meritorious class cases. For example, judges
could appoint as lead counsel only those lawyers who firmly “agree to commit time and
money to the case,” or judges could reduce attorney’s fees in cases that merely piggyback
on earlier public-enforcement actions. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 161–62, 172
(cited in note 7). Or judges might more regularly certify issue classes to adjudicate complex and expensive-to-prove questions common to the class. See id at 162–65. The glaring
problem with the latter proposal, which Coffee himself acknowledges, is that “[c]lass action attorneys are not interested in bestowing valuable findings on the attorneys in the
individual actions (where the actual recovery will come) unless they are fairly compensated for so doing.” Id at 164. Coffee suggests that this problem might be solved if courts
overseeing issue class actions required “that fees be paid out of any individual recovery
to the class attorneys,” but he notes that this cross court solution would not be “easy to
implement” or enforce. Id. To tackle the related problem of multiforum litigation in
which defendants settle with the plaintiffs’ lawyer who is willing to make the cheapest,
quickest deal—potentially selling out class-member interests—Coffee has an interesting
proposal to expand the authority of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation so that
the Panel can “consolidate cases in different states, or in state and federal court.” Id at
157. In his view, either federal legislation (pursuant to the Commerce Clause) or interstate compacts among “eight or so key states in which such litigation is common” could
enable the Panel to consolidate overlapping decisions and police potential collusion. Id at
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a carefully crafted “loser pays” system, or implementing a “seriously enforced system of sanctions for the assertion of weak
claims” (p 122). In Coffee’s view, such strategies would allow feeshifting against the plaintiffs’ lawyer who brings and loses a
meritless case, while also limiting the fee to “a reasonable
amount in relation to the plaintiff’s own costs and expected payoff” (p 165).16 Alternatively, Coffee suggests that a legislatively
enacted “loser pays” rule could be applied selectively—perhaps
“only to those cases that do not survive a motion to dismiss”
(p 167).17
Importantly, Coffee emphasizes caution in designing these
incentives: “[G]o too far in this direction, and entrepreneurial litigation ends” (p 122). And in this, he stands apart from the partisan critics of class actions—those who represent corporations that
“are threatened both by meritorious [ ] and frivolous actions” and
who thus “prefer overbroad reforms that will chill both types of
actions” (p 123).18 Coffee—the grown-up in the room—represents
the “limited constituency interested in optimal reforms that do
not ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’” (p 123).19
It has been an article of faith on my side of the class action
wars that when we open the drains to release bathwater, we lose
babies.20 Aggressive actions to curb “abusive litigation” invariably
chill the very class actions that Coffee agrees are beneficial. But
let’s not underestimate Coffee: let’s assume that he can calibrate
157–58. Many details would have to be worked out in practice, but Coffee’s concept
seems to be an elegant solution to a messy problem.
16 See also id at 165–68. As Coffee describes this reform model, the fee-shifting
would allow defendants to “resist . . . ‘meritless’ litigation but [would have] less impact
on cases where the merits are stronger.” Id at 166. Presumably, plaintiffs’ lawyers would
also “recognize that the prospect of fee shifting reduces the prospect of small settlements
based on the differential in litigation costs. As a result, fewer ‘weak’ cases would be
filed.” Id at 166–67.
17 Coffee does not grapple here with the changes in pleading rules wrought by Bell
Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009),
which may result in a greater number of cases that are dismissed at the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) stage and that are, therefore, potentially subject to Coffee’s tax
on “meritless” litigation. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 166 (cited in note 7).
18 See also Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 165 (cited in note 7) (warning that
any reform to class actions “has to be a balanced one,” lest a “Draconian response . . .
render the private attorney general extinct”).
19 See also id at 153 (observing that it “is not easy to strike” a balance between
“protecting the ‘negative value’ claimant . . . while also penalizing nuisance value suits”).
20 See, for example, Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Right of Citizens to Aggregate Small Claims against Businesses, 46 U Mich J L Ref 537, 542 (2013) (claiming that
the Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 131 S Ct 1740 (2011), “disabled
effective private enforcement of many laws made to protect citizens”).
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a filter that jettisons abusive litigation and keeps the babies
where they belong. Presumably, at that point, we would be rid of
the abusive-litigation problem. And we might even be able to reverse some of the bad policies that this critique has spawned:
the terribly restrictive doctrine and legislation that the courts
and Congress have generated in the name of combating abusive
class action litigation.21
In this hypothetical postreform world, where realigned
agency incentives help adjust the signal-to-noise ratio surrounding the class action debate, perhaps we can explore some important questions that otherwise get swept up into—and drowned
out by—the old partisan food fight. Maybe, free of abusivelitigation concerns, we can look at how we really regard the private attorney general model that is at the core of class actions.
This Review investigates the legitimacy and limits of the
private attorney general concept, stripped of abusive-litigation
concerns. For this inquiry, there is probably no richer environment than that of consequential class cases that seek structural,
institutional reform through injunctive relief. It is injunctive
cases, brought as mandatory, non-opt-out class actions under
Rule 23(b)(2), that bring into starkest relief concerns about the
assumption of power by private actors.22 When we look at those
cases, free from the distortions of the abusive-litigation problem,
do we still find areas in which observers encounter significant

21 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 125–27 (cited in note 7) (describing legislation that has provided defendants “greater protection” from class actions, including the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005). See also id at 127–30
(describing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes, 131 S Ct
2541 (2011), AT&T Mobility, and Comcast Corp v Behrend, 133 S Ct 1426 (2013), which
reveal that “[t]he class action may be dying the death of [ ] one thousand cuts”).
22 Coffee does not focus much attention on injunctive class cases in Entrepreneurial
Litigation. His primary example of these phenomena are nonmonetary securities class
settlements mandating additional disclosures. Not surprisingly, Coffee has a dim view of
these deals. See, for example, Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 41–42 (cited in
note 7) (reporting the results from studies of securities class action suits that found that
many settled not for “monetary relief ” but instead only for “cosmetic” changes to corporate governance structures); id at 45 (“[T]he process of settlement is dysfunctional, [ ] because [ ] cosmetic and nonpecuniary settlements enable plaintiff’s attorneys to obtain an
acceptable return at low risk.”); id at 92 (observing that the “vast majority [of M&A litigation] provided only for additional disclosures” rather than compensation to class members).
But securities class actions that settle for superficial changes do not even begin to represent the broader universe of injunctive-only class actions, and Coffee’s single-minded focus
prevents him from fully grappling with some of the more controversial aspects of the private attorney general model.
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discomfort with the private attorney general model? I believe
that we do.
I focus here on three such discomfort zones, all of which are
variations on a sort of the “who the heck are you” critique aimed
at the class action lawyer’s self-appointed assumption of power.
Part I considers what I call the “tyranny paradox”: the authority
of class counsel to engineer broad injunctive settlements and releases that may benefit a majority of class members while simultaneously disabling the rights of a minority to continue litigation for better or different relief. Part II examines the perceived
usurpation of the traditional role of public enforcers by selfappointed private lawyers. Finally, Part III takes on the clash
between realism and formalism in contemporary class action
practice—the disconnect between (1) the real practice of contemporary class action lawyers, particularly in sprawling, multidefendant litigations, and (2) the traditional conception of one
lawyer representing one client.
To explore these theoretical issues in a tangible context, I focus on a group of recent cases that provides a unique laboratory
for crystallizing and examining attitudes toward the private attorney general model. In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and
Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation23 (“MDL 1720”) and In re
American Express Anti Steering Rules Antitrust Litigation24
(“Amex ASR”) (together, “the Payment Card Cases”) involve
class actions brought on behalf of merchants against the major
credit card companies relating to the swipe fees that merchants
incur for accepting credit cards. In these cases, the private attorneys and defendants’ counsel negotiated industry-changing
reform of the rules that govern merchant credit card acceptance.
In the case of MDL 1720—brought against Visa and MasterCard,
as well as their largest member banks—the settlement called for
cash payments of roughly $7 billion, making it by far the largest
antitrust settlement in history.25 In the Amex ASR case, class
damages were unavailable as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant,26 in
which the Court upheld American Express’s (“Amex’s”) class action

23

991 F Supp 2d 437 (EDNY 2014).
2015 WL 4645240 (EDNY).
25 See Christie Smythe, Visa, MasterCard $7.25 Billion Fee Deal Wins Approval
(Bloomberg, Nov 9, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/T4J8-8YUA.
26 133 S Ct 2304 (2013) (“Italian Colors”).
24
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waivers.27 As a result, by the time of the proposed settlement,
Amex ASR focused entirely on the claims for injunctive relief and
on reforming Amex’s policies under Rule 23(b)(2).28 Both sets of
cases were driven by entrepreneurial lawyers who invested over a
decade of time and capital in the litigation.
But what makes the Payment Card Cases ideal for the purposes of our inquiry here is that they so squarely implicate each
of the three areas that I identify for enduring skepticism of the
private attorney general model. The Payment Card Cases are
peculiarly on point in teeing up the second discomfort zone: the
usurpation of public-enforcement prerogatives by private actors.
These cases also raise the “tyranny of the majority” problem.
The Amex ASR case in particular is like a perfect exam question
designed to illustrate the constitutional and policy concerns underlying private structural-reform litigation.
But the area in which the Payment Card Cases are truly
unique is in the third discomfort zone: the unease that the traditional bar and commentariat feel with the on-the-ground, realpolitik, actual practice of meaningful reform litigation. These cases
illustrate a high-impact collision of realism and formalism, in
which a lawyer intent on achieving industrial reform for his clients—and practicing all the politics and diplomacy necessary to
get there—smacks headlong into settled expectations regarding
how lawyers ought to behave.
Like many collisions, this one kicks off sparks that provide
rare illumination of the behind-the-scenes sausage making that is
normally the stuff of rank conjecture or the latest John Grisham
novel. But we have to be careful to keep our eyes on the narrow
inquiry here, as this story has no shortage of distractions: we get
this rare backstage pass because one of the defense-side lawyers
working on MDL 1720, Willkie Farr & Gallagher partner Keila
Ravelo, turns out to have been engaged in a long-running criminal
scheme to defraud her client, MasterCard, Inc, out of millions of
dollars.29 When her criminal activities came to light in December
2014, Ravelo was terminated and her files were searched, at which
point her employer discovered a great deal of correspondence
27

Id at 2312.
See Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *4 (describing the proposed settlement as
“effectively modify[ing] American Express’s Non-Discrimination Provisions,” resulting in
a prohibition on merchants imposing “differential surcharging” on “transactions completed with a specific brand(s) and/or product type(s)”).
29 See Robin Sidel, Keila Ravelo: From ‘Women Worth Watching’ to Under Arrest
(Wall St J, Aug 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/XLD8-QLK8.
28
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between Ravelo and Gary Friedman, a longtime friend and a
plaintiffs’ class action lawyer representing the merchant classes
in both MDL 1720 and Amex ASR.
Because the settlements in both cases were contested by
prominent objectors, and because Willkie Farr believed the correspondence may have contained “inappropriate” communications, the firm initiated a disclosure procedure under which the
Friedman-Ravelo communications were disclosed to all interested parties.30 Under court supervision, more than eighteen thousand pages of e-mails and other documents were ultimately produced under seal.31 At that point, the objectors were free to
wring whatever narrative they could out of the massive record to
argue that the MDL 1720 settlement, already long approved,
should be vacated under Rule 6032 and that the Amex ASR settlement, which had not yet been approved, should be rejected.33
And it is in these submissions—the briefs of the objectors, a decision of one federal judge, and a public response by Friedman—
that we see the collision between realism and formalism.
At this point, a whopper of a disclosure is in order. I am not
remotely unbiased here. Gary Friedman is my husband, and
Keila Ravelo was a friend for twenty years—I first met her when
I was a summer associate, and she was my assigned mentor at a
corporate law firm in 1994. I have watched as the FriedmanRavelo communications became the subject of conspiracy theories aimed at toppling the class action settlements, and I have
seen the credulity with which even the most fanciful arguments
are received by an audience primed to believe the worst about
the plaintiffs’ class action bar. Many people—from a federal
judge to professional objectors,34 from serious journalists to the

30

Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *6–7.
See Declaration of Theresa Trzaskoma, In re American Express Anti-steering
Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *2 (EDNY filed July 29, 2015).
32 See Objectors’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Grant Further Discovery, In re Payment Card Interchange
Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 05-MD-1720, *21–26
(EDNY filed Sept 1, 2015).
33 See Individual Merchant Plaintiffs’ Supplement in Opposition to the Proposed
Class Settlement, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil
Action No 11-MD-02221, *6–9 (EDNY filed June 12, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015
WL 4985768).
34 See, for example, Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *11 (concluding that “improper and disappointing conduct . . . fatally tainted the settlement process”).
31
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New York Post35—were lightning quick to latch onto the familiar
narrative of a plaintiffs’ class action lawyer selling out his clients’ interests, even when the evidence showed otherwise.36
The wells of distrust run deep in class action land. My suspicion is that even if we were to implement Coffee’s prescriptions
for fully aligning the incentives of class members and class counsel, we would not easily escape a sort of formalism that is itself
largely a by-product of concerns with Coffee’s abusive-litigation
problem. Even in a world that has solved Coffee’s abusivelitigation problem, I suspect that this formalism—these vague,
ex ante precepts for proper comportment, designed to obviate
nettlesome ex post inquiry into whether the agent has indeed
rendered loyal and able service to his principal—will persist,
vestigial, like a phantom limb.
I. THE TYRANNY PARADOX AND THE LIMITS OF RULE 23(B)(2)
Among the questions raised by mandatory class actions
seeking consequential injunctive relief is how to account for divergent preferences and agendas among the various members of
the represented class. It is easy to say that class-member interests must be “cohesive,” as courts and commentators invariably
do37—but what does that really mean, in kind and degree? After
all, significant injunctive-relief class actions will almost always
feature some measure of heterogeneity in the goals and agendas
of the constituent class members. If we tolerate relatively more
heterogeneity in the composition of these mandatory classes—
that is, if we allow the private attorney general, like the public
attorney general, to represent a group that is at least somewhat
heterogeneous in terms of member preferences—then we risk
sanctioning a tyranny of the majority. Settlement terms will reflect the preferences of the majority, while releases will snuff out
the ability of the minority to pursue its preferred resolutions
35 See, for example, Kevin Dugan, ‘Burn after Reading’ Email Sets Fire to AmEx
Credit-Card Pact (NY Post, Aug 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JR7L-K4ZZ (describing Friedman and Ravelo as “ethically challenged” and “bone-headed”).
36 See Gary Friedman, Open Letter Responding to Judge Garaufis’s Aug. 4 Opinion
(Sept 29, 2015) (“Friedman Open Letter”), archived at http://perma.cc/6ZXE-HYTJ (calling the proposed class settlement one “that would have provided historic benefits”).
37 See, for example, Lemon v International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No
139, AFL-CIO, 216 F3d 577, 580 (7th Cir 2000) (“Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such
that the case will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the class
nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class members.”).
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through litigation. On the other hand, if we tolerate relatively
less heterogeneity—that is, if we insist on a truly unitary set of
preferences and agendas—then we risk a tyranny of the minority,
by which a holdout, gadfly, or other outlier can deprive all class
members of important relief to which they are entitled and that
they would be unable to obtain in the absence of the class device.
It is not just the degree of heterogeneity that matters,
though; courts also need to look at what kind of class-member
interests are at stake. Certainly, a Rule 23(b)(2) class can accommodate substantial heterogeneity in class members’ views
on litigation strategy or in class members’ varying appetites for
trial risk.38 But what about directional interests? Doesn’t the
private attorney general have to show that the injunctive relief
directionally benefits all members of the class? And is that sufficient? These issues are not new. Back in the 1970s, a class led
by basketball star Oscar Robertson reached a settlement with
the NBA that “radically modified draft practices” and “virtually
eliminated option clauses.”39 Wilt Chamberlain objected that the
deal would foreclose his claims for different and better relief—
presumably, a true free agency system.40 Is it enough that
Chamberlain directionally benefited from the injunction along
with the other players? The courts thought so in that case.41
It is difficult in the abstract to assess the degree and kind of
heterogeneous interests that the contemporary private attorney
general suit can accommodate. So far as mandatory-injunctiverelief cases go, these issues have not been terribly well-developed
by courts or commentators.42 Part of the problem, I think, is that
38 See, for example, Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 Geo
Wash L Rev 651, 707 (2014) (observing that “subjective preferences or goals” do not
count for class cohesion because if they did, “[Rule 23(b)(2)] class actions would not qualify as strongly cohesive,” but remarking that “[e]ven a civil rights class action can include
class members with different preferences about the scope of injunctive relief and different views on the desirability of suing at all”); Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class Actions, 58 Vand L Rev 995, 1023–24
(2005) (“Different class members often act with different degrees of reasonableness, intent, and knowledge, are injured to different extents, value their losses differently, and
have differing goals for the outcome of litigation, but these differences are not necessarily relevant or material in every case.”).
39 Robertson v National Basketball Association, 556 F2d 682, 686 (2d Cir 1977).
40 Robertson v National Basketball Association, 72 FRD 64, 68 (SDNY 1976).
41 Id at 70–71 (holding that the settlement protected the interests of both players
and owners and noting that it would help facilitate peaceful and stable labor relations
“for many years to come”).
42 Professor Coffee, for example, has previously written on divergent class interests
in the context of Rule 23(b)(3)–damages suits. Coffee, 100 Colum L Rev at 389–90 (cited

2016]

Can John Coffee Rescue the Private Attorney General?

1013

context is so important. It is hard to conjure, let alone find, cases
that perfectly present the tyranny paradox that I have described
here. And yet the Amex ASR case does exactly that.
And so, at the outset, some background on the Amex ASR
case is in order.
A.

The Amex ASR Claims

In early 2005, plaintiffs’ attorneys began to file class action
lawsuits on behalf of merchant clients against Visa, MasterCard,
and Amex challenging their no-surcharge and antisteering rules:
the rules that prevent merchants from using so-called surcharges and steering to reduce their card-acceptance costs (the “merchant restraints”).43 A surcharge is an extra fee that the merchant can impose on the cardholder to cover the cost to the
merchant of the credit card transaction. When credit card networks impose high swipe fees on the merchant, a surcharge allows the merchant to recoup that cost and to induce cardholders—to steer cardholders—to use a cheaper (nonsurcharged)
payment product.
The core of the antitrust claims is that the merchant restraints insulate the card networks from having to compete with
one another on how they price their services to merchants, who
have suffered for years from swipe fees that vastly exceed those
elsewhere in the world.44 With the restrictive merchant restraints
in note 6) (noting that risk attitudes affecting litigation and settlement preferences are
bound to vary across any group of claimants). A handful of other scholars have examined
these issues in the Rule 23(b)(2) context, but they have primarily focused on the paradigmatic case of discernible class conflicts, in which some class members support specific reforms and others support directionally opposite reforms. See, for example, Bone, 82 Geo
Wash L Rev at 677–87 (cited in note 38); David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action,
104 Georgetown L J 777, 789–95 (2016); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and
the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 1057, 1077–80 (2002).
43 See, for example, The Marcus Corp v American Express Co, 2005 WL 1560484, *1
(SDNY). When a consumer uses a credit card, the merchant pays a fee ranging from a
few cents to a flat percentage amount of the transaction—usually between 1 and 3 percent, depending on the card type. The acquiring bank keeps some portion of this fee, and
the remainder of the fee goes to the network and the issuing bank as the interchange fee. See
Demystifying Credit Card Processor Fees (PayPal), archived at http://perma.cc/K4YR-2T5M.
See also Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of
Payment Systems, 12 Stan J L, Bus & Fin 425, 431–33 (2007).
44 According to estimates by the Merchants Payments Coalition, US merchants pay
swipe fees that are many times the fees that are paid by Europeans. See Oliver Tree, The
Great Plastic Robbery Continues: Visa, MasterCard Still ‘Ripping Off’ US Consumers
(International Business Times, Aug 3, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/F57Q-5S5F. See
also Levitin, 12 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 427 (cited in note 43) (“In 2006, U.S. merchants
paid nearly $57 billion to accept payment card transactions.”); id at 428–29 (observing
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in place, a merchant faced with high swipe fees cannot respond
by using surcharges to steer his customers to use cards that carry lower swipe fees, such as debit cards. But if merchants were
able to charge slightly more for high-swipe-fee cards—that is, to
impose a surcharge—then customers would rationally move to
lower-swipe-fee cards in order to avoid the surcharge. And as a
result, the card networks would have incentives to reduce their
swipe fees, lest they lose cardholders to the issuers of lower-fee
products.
From a policy perspective, the claims also attack the merchant restraints for enforcing a highly regressive system that
compels the least-affluent consumers to subsidize more-affluent
users of high-rewards cards. Simply put, swipe fees pay for rewards, such as frequent-flier miles, hotel stays, and cash-back
programs. Under the merchant restraints, the consumer who
chooses to use the high-rewards, high-swipe-fee card (like an
Amex charge card) does not bear the cost of that decision.45 Merchants must bake the cost of these expensive perquisites into
their prices for all goods and services.46 Consequently, users of
cash, debit, and electronic-benefits cards are subsidizing the highend rewards that affluent consumers earn on their premium-card
products, like Amex cards. Thus, Federal Reserve economists
have observed that the merchant restraints “produce[ ] a crosssubsidy of consumers who use higher-cost payment methods like
credit cards by consumers who use lower-cost methods like cash
or PIN debit,”47 and that the users of high-rewards cards—the
most-affluent consumers—on average “receive a $2,188 subsidy
every year” from users of lower-cost payment forms.48
that “the cost of accepting payment cards has increased” such that “for many merchants,
payment card acceptance has become the fastest growing cost of doing business”).
45 See Levitin, 12 Stan J L, Bus & Fin at 434 (cited in note 43) (noting that “consumers are not forced to internalize the costs of their choice of payment system” and that
“[a]s rewards cards have risen from less than 25% of new card offers in 2001 to nearly
60% in 2005, merchants find themselves performing more and more of their transactions
on costlier cards”) (citation omitted).
46 See id at 427–28 (“Merchants are unable to pass along the relative costs of different payment systems to consumers because the rules of the major payment card networks—MasterCard, Visa, American Express, and Discover—functionally require merchants to charge all consumers the same price, regardless of payment system.”).
47 Scott Schuh, et al, An Economic Analysis of the 2010 Proposed Settlement between the Department of Justice and Credit Card Networks *6 (Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, July 8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4KL6-9537.
48 Scott Schuh, Oz Shy, and Joanna Stavins, Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit
Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations *21 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Aug 31,
2010), archived at http://perma.cc/CG5U-K33V.
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Challenging Amex’s Arbitration Clause

Highlighting these anticompetitive and regressive effects, a
putative merchant class brought suit challenging Amex’s merchant restraints in 2005.49 But there was a problem: Amex’s
standard-issue card-acceptance contract included an arbitration
clause containing a class action waiver. A group of Amex merchants who were subject to the arbitration clause then challenged these provisions on various grounds.50 After the district
court upheld Amex’s class action waiver,51 the Second Circuit reversed, holding that—under the “vindication of statutory rights”
doctrine—arbitration clauses are generally not enforceable when
the prohibitive cost of arbitrating effectively precludes claimants
from vindicating federal rights, such as the antitrust claims at
issue here.52 The Second Circuit then reaffirmed that ruling
three more times in as many years, following intervening Supreme Court precedents.53
But in 2013, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Antonin
Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in Italian

49

See In re American Express Merchants Litigation, 2006 WL 662341, *1–2 (SDNY).
Id. At the time that the merchants challenged Amex’s clause, it was only small
merchants that were subject to arbitration. Thus, other larger, non-arbitration-bound
merchants were allowed to proceed with their litigation, even as their smaller brethren
fought the arbitration clause. See, for example, Marcus Corp, 2005 WL 1560484 at *1. By
the time of the Italian Colors decision, however, Amex had successfully required more
than 99 percent of its merchant base to agree to class action–waiving arbitration provisions. For a full account of the various strands of the Amex merchant litigation, see
Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class
Action Settlement, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil
Action No 11-MD-02221, *13–14 (EDNY filed Apr 15, 2014) (“Class Plaintiffs’ Opening
Brief on Final Approval”).
51 In re American Express Merchants Litigation, 2006 WL 662341 at *1.
52 In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F3d 300, 320 (2d Cir 2009)
(“Amex I”). See also id at 312, 316–17 (describing the expert report of economist Dr. Gary
French, who concluded that “it would not be worthwhile for an individual plaintiff . . . to
pursue individual arbitration or litigation where the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic study and services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars,
and might exceed $1 million”).
53 See In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 634 F3d 187, 189 (2d Cir
2011) (“Amex II”) (finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds International Corp, 559 US 662 (2010), did not mandate a different result); In
re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F3d 204, 212 (2d Cir 2012) (“Amex III”)
(finding that the string of Amex decisions “rests squarely on ‘a vindication of statutory
rights analysis’”—an issue untouched by AT&T Mobility); In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 681 F3d 139, 139 (2d Cir 2012) (“Amex IV”) (“[T]he limited holding in
this case is not governed by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.”).
50
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Colors.54 The majority held that the vindication-of-statutoryrights doctrine does not apply to invalidate an arbitration clause
just because it bars class or group proceedings and would thus
force individual claimants to assume prohibitive costs in one-onone arbitrations.55
In the wake of Italian Colors, Amex moved to dismiss the
merchant class action challenging the merchant restraints—the
Amex ASR case—and moved to compel one-on-one arbitration.
The Amex ASR plaintiffs had, up to this point, sought both class
damages and injunctive relief. After the Italian Colors decision,
however, the plaintiffs conceded that their multibillion-dollar
class damages claim was nonviable.56
But injunctive relief was another matter. The Amex arbitration clause prevents merchants from pursuing market-wide reforms; instead, it provides that the arbitrator may award relief
only to the individual claimant.57 Under this clause, a merchant
may win the right to impose surcharges on its own transactions in
arbitration, but the arbitrator has no power to force Amex to
change its rules across the market.58 The Amex ASR class plaintiffs thus resisted the motion to compel arbitration of their injunctive claims based on a distinct vindication-of-statutory-rights

54

Italian Colors, 133 S Ct at 2312.
Id at 2311. In a scathing dissent, Justice Elena Kagan complained that the majority’s response to the reality that an arbitration clause would impose burdens on a
claimant that rendered the vindication of rights impossible was, put simply, “[t]oo darn
bad.” Id at 2313 (Kagan dissenting).
56 See Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36) (asserting that class
counsel “persisted in demanding class damages right up until the Supreme Court took
that option off the table in its June 2013 Italian Colors decision, when it upheld Amex’s
class action waivers,” and that the damages demand “started at $2.2 [billion] and after
cert was granted in Italian Colors, [it] moved to $1.3 [billion]”) (quotation marks omitted). See also Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *13 (cited in note 50)
(“The Supreme Court’s June 2013 ruling in Italian Colors . . . upholding Amex’s collective action ban made it clear to Class Counsel that no damages class action was realistically feasible in Amex ASR.”).
57 See Card Acceptance for American Express *12 (Amex Merchant Services, Oct
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/R9HY-3W6G (providing that “[t]he arbitrator will have
no power or authority to alter th[e] Agreement or any of its separate provisions” and that
the agreement purports to ban broad injunctions on behalf of or awarded to merchants
beyond merely the named claimant).
58 See Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms: Challenging “Anti-reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U Miami L Rev 469, 471–73
(2015) (describing “anti-reform” provisions in arbitration clauses, which “prohibit an individual arbitral claimant from seeking to end a practice, change a rule, or enjoin an act
that causes injury to itself and to similarly-situated non-parties”).
55
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challenge that survived Italian Colors59—namely, that enforcement of Amex’s clause would prevent them from vindicating
their rights under the antitrust laws in order to pursue equitable relief that would “effectively pry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants’ illegal restraints.”60 If
the class plaintiffs were to prevail, they would have a live class
action that was seeking, for all US merchants, the unfettered
right to impose surcharges on Amex transactions.61 If Amex were
to prevail, then each merchant would only be able to seek such
rights for itself in costly one-on-one arbitrations—meaning that
99 percent of US merchants would be left out in the cold.62
Against this backdrop, with the motion to compel arbitration of the injunctive case sub judice, the parties agreed to settle
the case.

59 In Italian Colors, Scalia made clear that, despite upholding the Amex class waiver,
a vindication-of-statutory-rights challenge could still be asserted against “a provision in an
arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights,” and particularly
a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.” Italian Colors, 133 S
Ct at 2310. Post–Italian Colors cases have followed the same logic. See, for example, Parisi
v Goldman, Sachs & Co, 710 F3d 483, 487 (2d Cir 2013), citing Paladino v Avnet Computer
Technologies, Inc, 134 F3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir 1998) (“[L]anguage [in an arbitration
clause] insulating [a defendant] from damages and equitable relief renders the clause unenforceable.”). This opening allowed the class plaintiffs to argue that Amex’s arbitration
clause was unenforceable to the extent that it would ban merchants from seeking classwide
reform of Amex’s rules and practices.
60 Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Class Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules
Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *59 (EDNY filed July 14, 2014)
(available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 8480960) (“Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval”), quoting Zenith Radio Corp v Hazeltine Research, Inc, 395 US 100, 133 (1969).
61 See, for example, Gilles, 69 U Miami L Rev at 472–73 (cited in note 58) (asserting that “[t]hese legal arguments are serious and the stakes are high” because corporate
defendants do not want a regime in which “a single claimant could enjoin widespread
injurious practices in arbitration” or in which “arbitrators wielding unchecked authority
[could] issue broad and diverse injunctions in individual arbitrations”); id at 473:

[Q]uestions surrounding the enforceability of anti-reform clauses are just as
important to putative defendants as the class action bans they have spent
years defending; depending on the context, divesting individual claimants of
the power to enjoin or reform a market-wide policy or practice may be even
more critical than the threat of monetary liabilities.
62 See Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval at *34–35 (cited in note 60)
(observing that if the class were to lose the motion to compel arbitration of its equitable
claims, “each merchant [would] only be permitted to seek relief for itself in arbitration,
and would not be able to seek a rule change benefiting any other merchant,” and therefore concluding that “rejection of the Settlement would consign all merchants to a world
where each merchant may only seek to change the contractual rules that bind that merchant alone,” despite the fact that “meaningful relief requires an injunction that benefits
merchants across the market-place”).
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The Amex ASR Settlement

Under the terms of the proposed class settlement, Amex
would allow merchants to impose surcharges on Amex transactions.63 But while the class plaintiffs had sought in litigation the
unfettered right to use surcharges, the settlement allowed surcharging only subject to certain restrictions. The main restriction
was that a merchant surcharging Amex-branded cards must also
impose a similar (or parity) surcharge on all other credit cards it
accepts, with one very consequential exception.64 If the merchant
wished to impose a so-called differential surcharge—that is, to offer one or more credit card brands on a surcharge-free basis, or to
surcharge different credit cards at different amounts—it could
do that by applying a surcharge-offsetting discount to the favored brands.65 The settlement also contemplated that merchants might bring individual damages arbitrations—there was
no release of any damages claims—and it provided for access to
the full class action evidentiary record to aid merchants in this
pursuit.66 Finally, the agreement provided for attorney’s fees and
certain other costs in an amount to be determined by the court,
up to $75 million—a figure representing 84 cents on the dollar of
the billable time expended by some thirty law firms over eleven
years.67

63 Exhibit A: Class Settlement Agreement, In re American Express Anti-steering
Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *20 (EDNY filed Apr 15, 2014).
64 Id.
65 In essence, the offsetting-discount approach allows a card network to contract
with merchants to absorb some or all of the surcharge on its branded cards. See Class
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to Question Number 1 Posed by the Court in Its
Order Dated April 30, 2015, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *4 (EDNY filed June 1, 2015). Amex presumably believes that it would fare well competing in this way because it is able to contract more
nimbly with merchants than its competitors are. The merchants’ ability to employ this
strategy (that is, using surcharge-offsetting discounts as a way to do differential surcharging) was contingent on the DOJ winning its trial and invalidating Amex’s nodiscount rule, which it did in 2015. See United States v American Express Co, 88 F Supp
3d 143, 238–39 (EDNY 2015). See also text accompanying notes 81–84 (describing the
public enforcer’s role in the Payment Card Cases).
66 Because the settlement contemplated that merchants might bring individual
damages arbitrations, it provided access to the full class action evidentiary record. As
such, the settlement released only future claims for injunctive relief, and it did not release past claims for damages. Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *16
(cited in note 50) (stating that there is no release for past claims and that arbitral claimants are entitled to the entire evidentiary and litigation record from these cases).
67 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Class Counsel’s Motion for an Award of
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and for Leave to Distribute Service Awards, In re American

2016]

Can John Coffee Rescue the Private Attorney General?

1019

For the purposes of the settlement—which followed many
years of litigation, including more than 160 depositions and over
20 million pages of produced documents68—the court certified an
injunctive class under Rule 23(b)(2).69 The class consisted of all
Amex-accepting merchants, including about a dozen large merchants who had been litigating a parallel action against Amex
on a nonclass basis alongside class plaintiffs for years, including
Rite Aid Corp, CVS Pharmacy, Walgreen Co, and others (“the
Rite Aid group”).70 The proposed settlement would have precluded these plaintiffs from pursuing their individual claims, which
included seeking the ability to practice unfettered differential
surcharging. Under the settlement, members of the Rite Aid
group would be able to maintain their own actions for damages,
but the injunctive relief they received—the new surcharging
rules—would be dictated by the class settlement.
Consequently, the Rite Aid group objected to the proposed
settlement, arguing that the unfettered surcharging rights the
group had sought for years were markedly superior to the watereddown version obtained by the class.71 The Rite Aid group argued
that the difficulties most merchants would face in pursuing
these rights absent a class deal—that is, the expense of one-onone arbitrations—should not limit the Rite Aid group’s ability to
bring claims against Amex for the rules reforms that it wanted.72
And because the class settlement took unfettered surcharging
off the table, it severely diminished these plaintiffs’ leverage to
seek significant monetary relief in their individual damages

Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *12–13
(EDNY filed Apr 15, 2014).
68 See Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *19–20 (cited in note 50)
(describing in detail the exhaustive discovery process and multiple rounds of appellate
court briefing conducted over more than ten years before class counsel reached a settlement agreement).
69 Class Settlement Preliminary Approval Order, In re American Express Antisteering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *5–6 (EDNY filed Feb
11, 2014).
70 These merchants were not subject to Amex’s arbitration clause. See generally
Rite Aid Corp v American Express Travel Related Services Co, 708 F Supp 2d 257 (EDNY
2010) (involving individual claims arising from merchant agreements not falling within
the scope of Amex’s arbitration clause). But despite this enviable position, the Rite Aid
group did not offer to seek broad relief for the benefit of all merchants or otherwise to
“assume fiduciary duties to merchants.” Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval
at *5 (cited in note 60).
71 See Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval at *4–6 (cited in note 60).
72 See id.
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proceedings.73 Other very large merchants—including 7-Eleven,
Wal-Mart, Target, and others—joined the Rite Aid group in leveling these challenges as well.74
In response to these objections, class plaintiffs pointed to
data from around the world and argued that the restricted surcharging rights achieved in the settlement were nearly as effective as the unfettered surcharging that the large-merchant objectors sought.75 They also contended that there was a distinct
value in having a universal right to surcharge—that is, each
merchant benefits if all other merchants have the right to surcharge.76 Further, class plaintiffs maintained that there was no
better relief to be had for 99 percent of the 3.4 million Amexaccepting US merchants, because less than 1 percent of merchants could possibly have a sufficient stake to justify one-onone arbitrations seeking unfettered surcharging on an individual
basis.77 And it was undisputed by all that Amex would never
agree to unfettered surcharging in a class settlement.
D. The Tyranny Paradox
So how do we analyze a proposed injunctive settlement that
would provide a substantial benefit for a strong majority of class
members but that a minority of large merchants (less than 1 percent, accounting for 20 percent or so of volume) opposed on the
ground that they could do better for themselves if left to pursue
73 See Exhibit A: Transcript of Civil Cause for Status Conference before the Honorable Nicholas G. Garaufis United States District Judge, In re American Express Antisteering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action 11-MD-02221, *19 (EDNY filed Jan 25,
2014) (noting that counsel for the Rite Aid group argued to the judge that if he gave “final approval to the class settlement, it would extinguish [its] ability to challenge
[Amex’s] rules on the injunctive relief ” and asked that it “be exempted from any release
on the final judgment that they’re doing with the class”); id at *21 (“We, our clients, have
come forward because we had individual interests to vindicate here, but we can’t get full
vindication just with damages. . . . So there may well be a clash between us and the class
on the injunctive part.”); Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval at *2 (cited in
note 60) (“Understandably, the [Rite Aid objectors] want a live injunctive claim so they
can lever the greatest possible monetary settlement from Amex.”).
74 Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval at *2 (cited in note 60) (listing
prominent objectors and asserting that their real goal was to derail the MDL 1720 settlement by arguing that the surcharging relief in that case would be valueless if merchants were not also free to surcharge Amex, despite their previous lack of interest in
suing at any time).
75 Id at *5–6.
76 Id at *11.
77 Id at *6 (“Class Plaintiffs have been forthright that, yes, it would have been desirable to achieve for the six million class members the ability to engage in differential
surcharging. . . . But desirable and achievable are two different things.”).
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their own individual injunctive claims? What is the theoretical
font of authority that allows a self-nominated private attorney
general to determine that the interests of the majority should
foreclose a minority from pursuing its own interests in litigation? On the other hand, what would be the basis for refusing to
give vent to the majority’s interests—particularly when that majority is very likely to get no benefit at all in the absence of the
mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) settlement?78
1. The problem.
One way to approach these questions is, again, to think about
the nature of the divergent class-member interests. Surely, it is
one thing for a mandatory class to accommodate some level of
heterogeneous class-member preferences and strategic agendas,
but it is quite another thing to house, within a single non-opt-out
class, members with directionally opposed economic interests. For
example, if there were merchants who would affirmatively suffer
from an order banning Amex’s antisteering rules, one might well
question the cohesiveness of the proposed class.79
But where does that point us here? For present purposes,
let’s stipulate to the seemingly obvious point that the large merchants would clearly benefit (vis-à-vis their position today) even
from the weaker version of relief obtained by the class; they just
would not benefit as much as they would from the unfettered
surcharge rights that they might win in individual proceedings.
The real complaint, it seems, is that the class is settling for a
field goal when the larger merchants want to go for a touchdown.
If there were genuine directional conflict here, we might be able
to avoid the tough questions. But there isn’t, and we can’t.
What, then, is a private attorney general to do? In the Amex
ASR case, the decision was apparently not difficult for class counsel. With no directional conflict blocking the path, they wrapped
themselves in the interests of the 99 percent and unabashedly
sought to run roughshod over the rights that large merchants

78 See Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *7 (cited in note 50)
(“The alternative to this settlement is not a better settlement; it is no settlement.”).
79 But even then, we would need to ask: Suffer in what way? In litigation, Amex argued that many business owners carried Amex rewards cards and so were net beneficiaries
of the no-surcharge policies that redistributed wealth from cash payers to premiumrewards-card users. I assume that any such exogenous consideration is simply irrelevant
to the cohesion analysis. Likewise, I would not regard merchants who own Amex stock as
having interests that are opposed to those of the class.
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would otherwise have in order to seek additional relief.80 For reasons unrelated to Coffee’s abusive-litigation concerns—for surely
the Payment Card Cases raise no such concerns81—I imagine that
this aspect of a private attorney general model, this endemictyranny phenomenon, is deeply irksome to class action critics.
And yet, it seems fair enough for a lawyer to heed the interests of
a strong majority of his clients in any group environment.
So let’s rephrase the question: What is a district judge to do?
The judge in Amex ASR appeared caught between a tyranny of
the majority and a hard place. And doctrine was not going to
solve his problem.82 The Supreme Court stated the basic rule
(which it adopted from Professor Richard Nagareda) in WalMart Stores, Inc v Dukes:83 “The key to the [Rule 23(b)(2)] class
is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy
warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be
enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members
or as to none of them.’” 84 But that hardly solves the current
problem. Surely, the conduct was unlawful across the board and
it could and should be enjoined across the board—but does that
mean that the large merchants must abandon their claims for
additional relief on top of the available across-the-board relief?
Not obvious.

80 See Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval at *8–9 (cited in note 60) (“To
be sure, class members have varying personal preferences. Some have stated they would
prefer to pursue claims for full-blown differential surcharge rights, even at the risk of
losing all surcharge rights.”); id at *11:

[G]iving six million merchants the right to do simple surcharging does more
good for U.S. merchants as a whole than giving each of 15 or 50 (or 500 for that
matter) well-resourced and motivated merchants the right to initiate an individual arbitration at which, if the merchant wins, it may seek for itself alone
the right to engage in full-blown differential surcharging.
81 In Coffee’s argot, abusive litigation is characterized by weak or meritless claims
brought by unsophisticated lawyers who invest no time or effort in the claims and instead simply exploit the litigation cost differential, potential delay, or fear of crippling
class liability to press a nuisance value settlement. Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at
222 (cited in note 7). The Payment Card Cases do not qualify as abusive even under this
broad definition.
82 Nor does the text of the rule get us too far: Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied so long as the
defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FRCP 23(b)(2).
83 131 S Ct 2541 (2011).
84 Id at 2557, quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 NYU L Rev 97, 132 (2009).
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2. A Rule 23(b)(2) opt-out solution?
Faced with these competing plaintiff-side forces, a judge
might reasonably be tempted to allow dissatisfied class members
to opt out and seek additional relief for themselves. But does the
Rule allow for that? The pre–Wal-Mart Stores case law is useless
here.85 To the extent that opt-outs have been allowed under
Rule 23(b)(2), it has primarily been in the sort of “hybrid” cases
that Wal-Mart Stores abolished.86 In Wal-Mart Stores itself, the
Court observed that Rule 23(b)(2) “provides no opportunity for
. . . class members to opt out,”87 and some courts have suggested
that allowing opt-outs in injunctive cases would expose “defendants to varying and possibly inconsistent obligations” and to “the
possibility of conflicting judgments,” and that it would essentially “permit limitless collateral challenges [that] would greatly
diminish the possibility that complicated class actions for equitable relief would ever settle.”88
But there are ways for a court to effectively allow injunctive
opt-outs if it wishes. For example, there is nothing to stop a court
from demanding that a release exclude from its coverage any individual claims that the court thinks ought to go forward on a
nonclass basis.89 Or—unorthodox as this may be—a court could
announce that it is only willing to certify a settlement class under
Rule 23(b)(3), even though the relief will be purely injunctive.90
85 For the leading pre–Wal-Mart Stores case, see Allison v Citgo Petroleum Corp,
151 F3d 402, 411 (5th Cir 1998) (allowing some monetary claims for back pay to be
brought under Rule 23(b)(2)).
86 But see William Rubenstein, Alba Conte, and Herbert B. Newberg, 2 Newberg on
Class Actions § 4:36 at 144 (West 5th ed 2015) (observing that while opt-outs are not required in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, “they are discretionary, may be permitted, and have
been employed”).
87 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S Ct at 2558.
88 In re Colt Industries Shareholder Litigation, 566 NE2d 1160, 1166 (NY 1991).
See also In re A.H. Robins Co, 880 F2d 709, 728 (4th Cir 1989) (“[N]o member has the
right to opt out in a [Rule 23(b)(1)] or (b)(2) suit.”).
89 See FRCP 23(b)(3), (c)(2)(B)(iv) (providing the certification process for classes
and allowing for exclusions upon request).
90 Traditionally, injunctive claims are classed under Rule 23(b)(2), while damages
claims proceed under Rule 23(b)(3). See Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and
Mary Kay Kane, 7A Federal Practice and Procedure § 1775 at 470 (West 2d ed 1986) (“If
the Rule 23(a) prerequisites have been met and injunctive or declaratory relief has been
requested, the action usually should be allowed to proceed under subdivision (b)(2).”);
Jefferson v Ingersoll International Inc, 195 F3d 894, 898 (7th Cir 1999) (“Rule 23(b) begins by saying that an action ‘may’ be maintained as a class action when the prerequisites of subdivision (a) and a part of subdivision (b) have been satisfied; it does not say
that the class must be certified under the first matching subsection.”). Indeed, courts
have often granted injunctive relief in the context of Rule 23(b)(3) claims, at least when
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Rule 23 itself contains no prohibition against certifying a class for
injunctive relief under the auspices of Rule 23(b)(3), so long as
the class meets the higher standards of community, predominance, and superiority demanded by that provision.91 And
Rule 23(d)(1)(E)’s broad grant of powers to make appropriate orders arguably gives the court authority to permit opt-outs in
Rule 23(b)(2) cases.92 In general, Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible
to allow courts to direct that injunctive opt-out rights be provided for cases in which these class members have meaningful
claims to better or different relief.93
The more interesting question is whether to allow injunctive
opt-outs, at least when the opt-out claim seeks relief that is limited to the particular claimant as opposed to broad classwide relief. The issue is whether opt-out relief would be additive to class
relief, or whether it would subject the defendant to fundamentally
inconsistent obligations—a question that can be answered only in
a case-by-case analysis.94 In this respect, injunctive class action
claims seem quite different from the classic mandatory class action vehicle in Rule 23(b)(1), which is applicable to limited-fund

equitable and monetary damages are both sought. And when this occurs, opt-outs from
the Rule 23(b)(3) class are free to seek individual injunctive relief. See, for example, WalMart Stores, Inc v Visa U.S.A. Inc, 396 F3d 96, 112 (2d Cir 2005).
91 FRCP 23(b)(3).
92 Rule 23(d)(1)(E) endows district courts with discretion to “issue orders that . . .
deal with similar procedural matters.” FRCP 23(d)(1)(E). This discretion is meant to facilitate “the fair and efficient conduct of the action.” FRCP 23, Advisory Committee Notes
to the 1966 Amendments. See also County of Suffolk v Long Island Lighting Co, 907 F2d
1295, 1304 (2d Cir 1990) (finding that then–Rule 23(d)(5)—now Rule 23(d)(1)(E)—provided
ample authority for a district court’s decision to allow class members to opt out of a “limited
fund” class action brought under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)).
93 See Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to
Sue, 115 Colum L Rev 599, 652 (2015) (suggesting that “the determination of whether
opt-out rights are required should turn [ ] on the relationship between the individual
claims of absent class members and the scope of the defendant’s remedial obligation” rather than on a “sharp distinction between equitable claims and monetary claims”);
McReynolds v Richards-Cantave, 588 F3d 790, 800 (2d Cir 2009), quoting Eubanks v Billington, 110 F3d 87, 94 (DC Cir 1997) (allowing a Rule 23(b)(2) plaintiff who objected to
the settlement to opt out, stating that “[t]he right of a class member to opt-out in
Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions is not obvious on the face of the rule; however, ‘the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district courts discretion to grant opt-out
rights in (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions’”); Long Island Lighting, 907 F2d at 1302–05.
94 Professor Jay Tidmarsh provides an economist’s definition of “additive,” suggesting that “court[s] should [ ] extend the privilege of opting out to all class members who
can demonstrate that the marginal expected net loss to the value of the class action from
their departure will be offset by the marginal expected net gain as a result of their ability to proceed alone.” Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev
227, 243 (2014).
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cases.95 When there is not enough money to go around for all
claimants, then any opt-out claim for individual damages will
necessarily conflict with the class action. But there is no such
structural reason for assuming that individual injunctive claims
conflict with class relief.
And indeed, one could argue that the Due Process Clause
demands opt-out rights in claims for truly individualized, additive injunctive relief of the sort that the members of the Rite Aid
group sought for themselves in Amex ASR.96 Wal-Mart Stores
expanded on prior doctrine by recognizing that due process demands that class members must have the right to opt out from
cases involving any nonincidental claims for monetary relief, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs had framed their claims as
ones for nominally injunctive or “hybrid” relief.97 It is no giant
leap from that argument to say that any claim to remediate or
protect against a concrete economic harm—whether framed as a
claim for damages or for injunctive relief—demands opt-out
rights as a matter of due process. After all, if the Rite Aid group
were seeking damages to redress all the past and future harms
that it stood to suffer from Amex’s illegal conduct, there would
be no question that it could opt out. Why does it have no such
95

Rule 23(b)(1) allows class actions when

prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would
create a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual
class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests
of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
FRCP 23(b)(1).
96 By contrast, in MDL 1720, objectors argued only that the injunctive relief was
insufficient consideration for a broad release and not that any objector had additive, individual injunctive claims that he wished to bring on his own. So the rationale for injunctive opt-out would be lacking in MDL 1720, unless one buys into the argument,
which seems dubious, that Rule 23(b)(2) is simply unconstitutional because it lacks optout rights. See, for example, Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural Due Process in
Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U Mich J L Ref 347, 394 (1988) (“The problem of the
Rule 23(b)(2) class action is that binding absent class members without giving them notice and the right to opt out violates due process.”).
97 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S Ct at 2559. In Phillips Petroleum Co v Shutts, 472 US
797 (1985), the Supreme Court held that “due process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.” Id at 812.
Wal-Mart Stores built on Phillips Petroleum to the extent of noting the “serious possibility” that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process, which would “provide[ ] an
additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary damages claims” in
that case. Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S Ct at 2559.
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opt-out right if it seeks to address that same harm by forcing
Amex to change its conduct toward the Rite Aid group? On this
view, Wal-Mart Stores is quite possibly not the end point for the
expansion of due process–driven opt-out rights. The Rule 23(b)(2)
shoe may yet drop.
In any event, we have here the seeds of a potential solution
to the tyranny paradox. In an appropriate case, a judge could
condition approval of a class settlement on the parties’ agreement to allow individual class members, or some subset of class
members, to bring certain defined claims for injunctive relief.
Class members seeking exclusion could be compelled to submit a
request—perhaps during a narrow opt-out window—proclaiming
an intent to seek additional individual relief and even describing
the specific relief sought. This brief statement would allow the
judge to see that a real class member seeks to vindicate a real interest and would help the judge to ensure that the opt-out relief
sought is individualized, additive, and consistent with the class
relief.
Defendants, seconded by settling class counsel, will argue
that incentives to negotiate injunctive settlements are vitiated if
there is a risk that absent class members may be afforded individual opt-out rights.98 And there is much to recommend that
view: after all, if the opt-outs will receive the benefit of the class
relief anyway, then opt-out injunctive plaintiffs can free ride in
ways that the damages opt-outs arguably cannot. But does this
remove the incentive to participate in the class deal? In Amex
ASR, one could argue that Amex stood to gain a great deal by
settling with the class, even if the Rite Aid group and other large
merchants were left free to pursue unfettered surcharging rights
in individual proceedings. How many merchants will submit requests for exclusion affirming an intent to file an individual injunctive claim? Maybe 1 percent? On those numbers, even assuming that the 1 percent represented some of the country’s
largest merchants, Amex would gain the knowledge that 99 percent of US merchants would not adopt the specific surcharging
98 Of course, in any given case, the defendant could decline the court’s invitation to
modify the agreement to include opt-out rights (or carveouts), thus effectively scrapping
the agreement. But that is a risk we should gladly tolerate to eliminate the tyranny paradox. And I think the risk is an unavoidable one, unless we are prepared to mandate optout rights—the way that we do with Rule 23(b)(3)—which in many cases would mean
that we were gutting the class relief to allow the individual claims. Also, if opt-out rights
were truly mandatory—that is, if defendants had no right to back out of the deal—it would
be too risky in many cases for the defendant to negotiate a settlement in the first place.
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practices that it deemed so dangerous to its business—practices
that might otherwise spread across the marketplace.99
On this model, 99 percent of merchants stand to gain the
long-sought right to impose surcharges—not the unfettered variety, but meaningful and valuable rights nonetheless. And the
large merchants (the 1 percent) will have their opportunity to
pass up the field goal and go for the touchdown—and gain significant leverage for use in their individual damages arbitrations.
And because those minority interests will be served without
scrapping the class settlement, private enforcement of the antitrust laws will play its intended role of “pry[ing] open” markets
to competition.100
Coffee’s project of incentive alignment is surely furthered by
a limited opt-out right. To the extent that the class contains
some diversity of goals and preferences, the opt-out mechanism
allows class counsel to align themselves unreservedly with the
majority, without adversely affecting the interests of the minority members. In the damages context, Coffee has written that the
“value of the right to opt out may lie more in its utility as a
checking mechanism than in its ability to protect litigant autonomy,” because when enough members opt out, the “practical net
effect might be to torpedo the dubious settlement or force its renegotiation.”101 Here, the opt-out right serves this checking function and gives opt-outs greatly valued autonomy.
Further to Coffee’s project, the potential opt-outs, and specifically their exclusion requests, would serve a valuable monitoring function. As Coffee counsels, judges supervising class action settlements are often “unable or unwilling to monitor the
settlement process rigorously” (p 195). These judges “need allies,” he tells us, to help them more effectively supervise privately negotiated pacts (p 195). In Rule 23(b)(2) settlements, courts
would glean a great deal from requests for exclusion that briefly
describe the individual relief that is sought. These requests
would give a court far-greater insight into the merits of a proposed settlement vis-à-vis its real-world alternatives than the
court is likely to acquire from the current objection process,

99 See Class Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief on Final Approval at *11 (cited in note 60) (discussing the “snowball effect,” in which the practice of surcharging—both parity and differential—spread in Australia after the no-surcharge rules were invalidated there in the
early 2000s).
100 Zenith Radio, 395 US at 133.
101 Coffee, 95 Colum L Rev at 1450 (cited in note 5).
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which is often obscured by a profiteering objectors’ bar and the
murky agendas of objecting parties.102 As Coffee recognizes, “settling parties have a strong desire to blind the court to the imperfections in their settlement, and so lock arms and compliment
each other” (pp 138–39). Allowing injunctive opt-outs would certainly disrupt this convivial klatch, but the practice seems well
designed to fortify the private attorney general model.
3. Anticlimax: the court’s punt in Amex ASR.
Whether remarked on or not, the tyranny paradox is present
to one degree or another in almost all consequential class actions
that seek reform. Recent cases—such as those involving NCAA
athletes seeking compensation for their services,103 sports fans
seeking the unrestricted ability to watch their favorite out-ofmarket teams,104 Uber drivers (and other “gig economy” workers)
seeking employee-type benefits,105 authors seeking royalties for
electronic publishing,106 or Silicon Valley engineers challenging
102 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 138 (cited in note 7) (describing members of the professional-objector bar as “unloved figures” who appear to be “motivated by
the hope that either (1) they can convince the court to award them a portion of the
amount by which the court cuts the proposed plaintiff’s attorneys’ fee award or (2) they
will be paid off by class counsel not to appear at the hearing”).
103 See O’Bannon v National Collegiate Athletic Association, 802 F3d 1049, 1053
(9th Cir 2015) (affirming that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny, issuing a decision in aid of the 1 percent, and finding that rules prohibiting scholarships up
to the cost of attendance were invalid while rules prohibiting payment to studentathletes for the use of their images or other commercial activities were not).
104 See Laumann v National Hockey League, 105 F Supp 3d 384, 388, 400 (SDNY
2015) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) antitrust class challenging agreements entered into by
the MLB, the NHL, regional sports networks, DirecTV, and Comcast that “limit options,
and increase prices, for baseball and hockey fans who want to watch teams from outside
the home television territory [ ] where the fans live,” and rejecting the existence of a fundamental intraclass conflict between “winners and losers” in which injunctive relief
would benefit some fans in some markets but have no effect on others).
105 See O’Connor v Uber Technologies, Inc, 2015 WL 5138097, *12 (ND Cal), quoting
Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, O’Connor v Uber Technologies, Inc, Civil Action No 13-03826, *30 (ND Cal filed July
9, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 4554634) (noting the defendant’s argument,
in opposition to the certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class of Uber drivers alleging that the
company failed to pay tips and other perquisites, that putative class representatives
sought “a remedy—an employment relationship with Uber—that irreconcilably conflict[ed] with the interests of countless drivers”).
106 See In re Literary Works in Electronic Databases Copyright Litigation, 654 F3d
242, 252 (2d Cir 2011) (rejecting a class settlement governing future uses of authors’
works—including those with registered and unregistered copyrights—in electronic publishing when “named plaintiffs with only Category C claims were obligated to advance
the collective interests of the class, rather than those of the subset of class members
whose claims mirrored their own”).
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antipoaching agreements among employers107—invariably result
in deals struck by class counsel on behalf of all members, notwithstanding the fact that some members, if left to their own devices, might be able to obtain or threaten to obtain superior relief.
And in an age in which the ability to obtain money damages via
class actions is being restricted because of class waivers and other
doctrinal developments,108 the forfeiture of individual equitable
claims spells the forfeiture of valuable settlement leverage.
Few cases could have presented these tyranny-paradox issues more starkly than Amex ASR, in which the proposed settlement was exhaustively briefed and argued by highly sophisticated lawyers on all sides. The district judge—Judge Nicholas
Garaufis of the Eastern District of New York—was presented
with a golden opportunity to address these undertheorized but
critical issues.
However, distrust of class action lawyers runs deep. And as
I mentioned, when Willkie Farr partner Ravelo was arrested for
fraud in December 2014, a search of her e-mails turned up substantial correspondence with Amex ASR lead counsel Friedman,
a longtime friend.109 That correspondence was then produced to
all of the Amex ASR objectors.110 And while some of those largemerchant objectors (including the Rite Aid group) eschewed any
attempt to argue that the Friedman-Ravelo communications
provided a reason to reject the deal—instead urging the court to
rule on the merits of the settlement111—others (including 7Eleven and Target)112 argued that some sort of conspiracy was

107 See In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation, 2015 WL 5159441, *3–4 (ND
Cal) (approving a damages settlement over the objections of individual employees asserting that the settlement formula did not provide them with full recovery and that they
could do better at trial).
108 See, for example, Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 15–17 (cited in note 7);
Myriam E. Gilles, The End of Doctrine: Private Arbitration, Public Law and the Antilawsuit Movement *7–21 (Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Aug 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/D8H6-C5HQ (describing recent legislative and judicial efforts to limit or
eliminate class actions).
109 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *6–7.
110 Id at *7.
111 Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to Question Number Two Posed by
the Court in Its Order Dated April 30, 2015, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules
Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *3 (EDNY filed July 29, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 7252727) (“Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to
Question Number Two”) (noting that the Rite Aid group did not join in the other objectors’ “conspiracy theory”).
112 Id at *1. Commentators have taken note of the agendas of these large-merchant
objectors in attempting to derail the MDL 1720 settlement at all costs. See, for example,
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afoot and that Friedman’s communications with Ravelo, a lawyer for nonparty MasterCard, had tainted the settlement.113
Judge Garaufis rejected the class action settlement.114 As I
discuss more fully in Part III, he did so without grappling with
the tyranny paradox and without ruling on the merits of the
proposed agreement. Instead, the court rejected the settlement
based on what I have identified as a distinct “discomfort zone”—
a disconnect between normative intuitions about how a lawyer
ought to conduct the business of litigation, on the one hand, and
the practical, on-the-ground realities of complex, multiforum litigation, on the other.
II. THE PUBLIC ENFORCER
The second discomfort zone revolves around the perceived
usurpation of the traditional role of public enforcers by selfappointed private lawyers. These concerns are familiar in the
context of Rule 23(b)(3)–damages class cases: Professor Coffee
has long noted that the presence of a profit motive distinguishes
private and public attorneys general in material ways,115 and
class action critics have found it especially galling that private
lawyers don the garb of the public enforcer to bring unmeritorious cases in the hopes of shaking down corporate defendants.116
But once we have filtered out suspect claims via Coffee’s
prescriptions, what discomfort remains with the private attorney

Todd Zywicki, Consumers Are the Winners in the Visa/Mastercard Antitrust Settlement
(Forbes, Aug 21, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Y26D-Q53T:
What explains the opposition of this group? Most likely, simple self-interest.
. . . By blowing up the litigation settlement, the big box retailers can perpetuate litigation uncertainty and preserve the political option of extending the
Durbin Amendment’s punitive price controls to credit cards, giving them a regulatory edge as they roll out their new payment network.
113 See The 7-Eleven Objectors’ Submission regarding the Impact of the FriedmanRavelo Communications on the Court’s Review of the Proposed Settlement, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *1
(EDNY filed July 29, 2015).
114 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *1.
115 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 221 (cited in note 7) (describing many within the plaintiffs’ class action bar as having “the incentive to overreach and litigate every
profitable opportunity, regardless of its merit”). See also Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 220–28
(cited in note 5).
116 See, for example, William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General”
Is—and Why It Matters, 57 Vand L Rev 2129, 2147–48 (2004) (cataloguing critiques
against the private attorney general model, with a focus on class action lawyers that
supplement public-enforcement actions).
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general—in Coffee’s terms, with “a private enforcer performing a
public role . . . without authorization by the legislature” (p 152)?
Plenty, as it turns out. In the traditional Rule 23(b)(3)–
damages context, a major concern—quite separate from abusivelitigation issues—is the “piling on” problem: when a public enforcer brings an enforcement action uncovering a violation
(especially in securities, antitrust, and consumer areas), the
private bar invariably responds by filing a spate of copycat damages claims.117 The traditional critique is that these follow-on
cases result in overdeterrence: the private bar is not interested
in calibrating to some optimal deterrence level; its disposition is
always maximalist.118 The politically accountable public enforcer,
on the other hand, will tend to seek a point of equilibrium in the
public interest.119 And as Coffee shows, for matters in which both
private and public enforcers take action against a corporate defendant, the private recoveries vastly outstrip the public recoveries by a margin of more than ten to one (pp 174–75). This fact
speaks well to the efficacy of the private bar, but it does nothing
to quell concerns regarding overdeterrence.120
117 Indeed, Coffee has long inveighed against the inefficiencies of piggyback class
actions. See, for example, Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 228 (cited in note 5) (describing the
“spectacle . . . in which the filing of the public agency’s action serves as the starting gun
for a race between private attorneys, all seeking to claim the prize of lucrative class action settlements, which public law enforcement has gratuitously presented them”); id at
222 (observing that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers “simply piggyback[ ] on the [enforcement] efforts of public agencies . . . in order to reap the gains from the investigative work
undertaken by these agencies”). See also John C. Coffee Jr, Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum L Rev 669, 681 (1986) (describing the substantial
number of class actions that are sparked by government investigations).
118 See, for example, Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 223 (cited in note 5) (observing that
follow-on class actions do not result in a broader “scope of law enforcement” or better deterrence but only in an intensified penalty); Beisner, Shors, and Miller, 57 Stan L Rev at
1453–54 (cited in note 2) (“The reason class action lawyers prefer to follow—rather than
to lead—government investigations is simple: those lawyers prefer ‘no research’ lawsuits
that appear likely (from the investigation itself) to yield lucrative settlements with only
a minimal investment of time and money.”).
119 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 191 (cited in note 7) (describing the
SEC’s response to the “Coffee proposal” as arguing for greater use of private counsel by
public enforcers and noting that “the SEC’s general goal is [not] to sue as many deeppocketed parties and collect as much in penalties as possible” but instead to “aggressively [ ] uphold the law and serve the interests of justice”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); id at 17 (“Entrepreneurial enforcement is . . . seldom constrained by the same
principles of prosecutorial discretion that guide public enforcers.”).
120 In this vein, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York compares
a series of “relatively paltry” SEC settlements with the tremendous success of private
securities class actions brought by specialized and well-resourced plaintiffs’ firms, which
suggests that the class action is “a much better vehicle for bringing justice to the victims
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In the context of Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive claims, however, the
concerns are different. It is not cases in which the government enforcers are acting that present a problem for critics; it is the cases
in which they are not.121 When private attorneys seek reforms
that public enforcers have not chosen to seek—and maybe even
claims that public enforcers have affirmatively chosen not to
seek122—then we are really courting the “who the heck are you”
problem. The critique is that the private attorneys are subverting
the prosecutorial prerogative of the public enforcer.123 And in consequential injunctive cases, in which remedial orders can look an
awful lot like legislation, the perceived usurpation of publicenforcement authority is at its zenith. In this sense, the purest
distillation of the private-versus-public problem is not found in
the Rule 23(b)(3)–damages class cases at all; it is in the injunctive
sphere, where litigation encroaches on traditionally legislative
turf—and where court cases that are prosecuted by unelected private lawyers have the effect of rewriting the rules of the road for
defendants and sometimes of reforming entire industries.124
of the alleged fraud.” Jed S. Rakoff, The Cure for Corporate Wrongdoing: Class Actions
vs. Individual Prosecutions (The New York Review of Books, Nov 19, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/82L8-38AV. But, as Rakoff rightly observes, “the monies awarded to the
victim shareholders” in class suits “are paid not by the executives responsible for the
frauds, but by the companies themselves.” Id. As such, Rakoff concludes that private
“class actions are no real substitute for criminal and regulatory prosecution of the individuals actually responsible for corporate misconduct.” Id.
121 See, for example, Beisner, Shors, and Miller, 57 Stan L Rev at 1454 (cited in note 2):
Some private class actions combine the worst of both worlds—they are “coattail” lawsuits and they supplant the reasoned decisions of state officials. Many
class actions, for example, are filed precisely because a state or federal regulatory agency has investigated an alleged problem and concluded that no punishment or remedial action is called for under the circumstances. Class action
lawyers then “piggyback” on the factual work undertaken by the agency and
simply use the class action vehicle as a way to relitigate the decision whether
remedial action is required.
122 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 17 (cited in note 7) (“[T]he plaintiff’s
attorney does not simply supplement public enforcement but extends and drives the
law’s development, sometimes pushing it in directions that public enforcers would not
have gone.”).
123 See Beisner, Shors, and Miller, 57 Stan L Rev at 1455 (cited in note 2) (“[W]hen
class action lawyers file lawsuits state officials have not filed . . . [they] perform the antidemocratic function of usurping the role traditionally entrusted to expert regulatory
agencies and state attorneys general.”).
124 In fact, Coffee tells us, the primary reason that other countries have not generally adopted US-style aggregate-litigation systems is discomfort with the concept of a “private enforcer performing a public role in order to solve collective action problems but
without authorization by the legislature.” Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 152 (cited
in note 7).
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How legitimate is this concern with subverting prosecutorial
authority? Might not the private attorney general sometimes
serve as a “failsafe,” in Coffee’s words, against agency capture
and political considerations that lead to the underenforcement of
important legal rights (p 6)?125 And how much deference should
we accord to agency nonenforcement decisions in the context of
broad remedial statutes? Should we be concerned that private
actors, in seeking broad structural reform, will be less sensitive
than their public counterparts to encroaching on the legislative
process—that is, bigfooting their way into areas of ongoing congressional concern? And what is the utility of private attorneys
general in cases in which public enforcers do act? Does it matter
whether private lawyers are unwelcome interlopers into a government action, as opposed to harmoniously working side by
side? How about when the government joins an ongoing private
case? For each of these questions, Amex ASR provides a realworld context for examination.
A.

Amex ASR

In 2009, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was coming out
of an eight-year torpor, having not initiated any conduct cases
during all of President George W. Bush’s administration.126 But
early that year, the DOJ served Visa and MasterCard with substantive civil investigative demands relating to their merchant
restraints.127 Meanwhile, also in early 2009, the Second Circuit
in In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation128 cleared the
Amex ASR class plaintiffs to proceed by invalidating Amex’s

125 See also id at 6 (“Private enforcement thus plays a failsafe function, arguably
protecting society against the danger that important legal rules . . . may, from time to
time, be quietly underenforced.”).
126 See, for example, Jonathan B. Baker and Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in Robert Pitofsky, ed, How the Chicago School Overshot the
Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S. Antitrust 235, 244 (Oxford
2008) (observing that the Bush administration was “more permissive on antitrust issues
than any administration in modern times”); Albert A. Foer, ed, The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust Institute’s Transition Report on Competition Policy to the
44th President 58–65 (Vandeplas 2008) (reporting that the Bush administration had initiated no monopolization cases and describing this practice as a “virtual interment of
Section 2 [of the Sherman Act]”).
127 See Jessica Dye, AmEx to Fight DOJ on Merchant-Fee Antitrust Claims (Law360,
Oct 4, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/F7PY-USRX (reporting that the DOJ and various state attorneys general issued civil investigative demands on Visa and MasterCard
relating to their card-acceptance-fee rules).
128 554 F3d 300 (2d Cir 2009).
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class action waiver.129 As they commenced a daunting discovery
process, Amex ASR class counsel then approached the DOJ, urging it to expand its investigation to include Amex.130 Among other things, counsel hoped that the DOJ’s involvement might serve
to unearth higher-quality documents in the discovery process
and to put additional pressure on the defendant.131
In October 2010, after completing investigations and negotiations, the DOJ announced a consent decree with Visa and
MasterCard and filed a lawsuit against Amex.132 Like the private cases, the DOJ actions challenged the three networks’ antisteering rules, but unlike the private cases, the Government’s
cases stopped short of challenging the rules against surcharging,
which presented a politically sensitive issue. To hear the private
lawyers tell it, the government attorneys fully understood and
agreed that rescission of the no-surcharge rules was a key component of industry reform, and yet they backed off at the last
minute because the issue of credit card surcharging promised to
become a political hot potato.133 Card networks have attempted

129 See text accompanying notes 49–62 (discussing challenges to the Amex class action waiver). See also Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *12 (cited in
note 50) (“Because the merchants challenging Amex’s anti-steering rules were all subject
to the arbitration clause, the Amex ASR case was largely stayed from its inception in
2006 until the Second Circuit ruled in Italian Colors in January 2009. At that point, the
parties commenced discovery in earnest.”).
130 See Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *12 (cited in note 50)
(“Class Counsel submitted to the Justice Department—whom it understood was investigating Visa and MasterCard’s rules relating to merchant steering—a white paper entitled ‘Why The Antitrust Division Should Challenge American Express’s Anti-Steering
Rules.’”).
131 See Peter Eichenbaum, Visa Says Justice Department Weighing Antitrust Suit
(Bloomberg, July 29, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/BZ4M-FZSR (quoting MDL 1720
lead counsel K. Craig Wildfang as saying that “[h]aving another government agency conclude that these things are anticompetitive . . . and to have the DOJ weigh in on this,
would be, in the grand scheme of things, helpful to the private plaintiffs”).
132 Competitive Impact Statement, United States v American Express Co, Civil Action
No 10-04496, *2 (EDNY filed Oct 4, 2010) (available on Westlaw at 2010 WL 10912947).
See also Justice Department Sues American Express, Mastercard and Visa to Eliminate
Rules Restricting Price Competition; Reaches Settlement with Visa and Mastercard (DOJ,
Oct 4, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/W2LN-ZBHH.
133 It is unclear at what level the DOJ’s surcharging case was kiboshed, but there was
broad speculation as to what might have caused the about-face. At the time, I heard from
two different sources the rumor that the Antitrust Division gave a green light to the attack
on the no-surcharge rules but that senior White House officials nixed the plan, fearing potential political fallout if the administration were perceived to be imposing checkout fees on
US consumers. Compare Justice Department Sues American Express, Mastercard and Visa
(cited in note 132) (noting that the complaint focused on “rules that prohibit merchants
from encouraging consumers to use lower-cost payment methods”), with U.S. District Court
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for decades to spin surcharging as “anticonsumer.” Visa in particular has widely employed faux grassroots organizations—with
names like “Consumers Against Penalty Surcharges”—to get out
the message that surcharges are anticonsumer checkout fees.134
And while merchants and major consumer organizations have
long understood that no-surcharge rules are anticompetitive and
regressive, it is reasonable to assume that the Obama administration was concerned with political backlash.135
Still, while it did not attack the no-surcharge rules, the DOJ
did go forward aggressively with the claim against Amex’s other
antisteering restraints—for example, the prohibitions against
merchants advertising “We Prefer Discover” or offering their
consumers a discount for using Visa.136 For four years, DOJ lawyers worked shoulder to shoulder with counsel for the merchant
plaintiffs—sharing time at depositions, discussing strategies,
and keeping one another apprised of developments. Ultimately,
the DOJ proceeded to a full-blown seven-week bench trial
against Amex, which the DOJ won, resulting in an injunction
rescinding Amex’s antisteering restraints.137 However, the DOJ
Rules That American Express Violated Antitrust Laws (DOJ, Feb 19, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/UF2A-ZQU3 (noting that “[t]he trial focused on . . . ‘swipe fees’”).
134 In a 1987 internal memorandum, the public relations firm Hill+Knowlton
bragged that its agents, and specifically veterans of its tobacco campaigns, had “put together ‘Consumers Against Penalty Surcharges’ for a coalition of credit card companies.”
Exhibit C: Hill and Knowlton Memorandum, Italian Colors Restaurant v Harris, Civil
Action No 14-00604, *2 (ED Cal filed Aug 15, 2014). See also Discover Card Abandons
Cardholders in Battle against Check Out Fees (PR Newswire, Feb 14, 2006), available at
http://perma.cc/E59B-DJRQ (describing “merchant imposed check out fees” as unfair and
anticonsumer, and disclosing that the organization “enjoys the financial support of
VISA USA”).
135 Major consumer organizations, including Consumer Action, the National Association of Consumer Advocates, the National Consumers League, and the US Public Interest Research Group, have submitted numerous amicus curiae briefs in support of merchant efforts to strike down laws against surcharging, emphasizing that such rules
essentially impose highly regressive wealth transfers. See, for example, Motion of Amici
Curiae Consumer Action, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumers League, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group for Leave to File a Brief as
Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Italian Colors
Restaurant v Harris, Civil Action No 14-00604, *1 (ED Cal filed Nov 19, 2014).
136 See United States v American Express Co, 21 F Supp 3d 187, 193, 197 (EDNY
2014) (denying Amex’s motion for summary judgment and finding that its “anti-steering
rules, which limit the ability of merchants to ‘steer’ customers toward the use of another
card,” may violate the antitrust laws).
137 United States v American Express Co, 88 F Supp 3d 143, 152, 238–39 (EDNY
2015). See also Christie Smythe, American Express Loses Antitrust Suit over Merchant
Rules (Bloomberg, Feb 19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7ULR-KRU6 (reporting that
the case “went to trial in July and was held without a jury” and that “[m]ore than 30 witnesses testified, including representatives from airlines, retailers and hotel companies”).
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trial win did not deliver to merchants the long-sought right to impose card surcharges—and so the private plaintiffs soldiered on.
And at this point, two aspects of the private-public partnership bear note. First, there is a legislative story. Large merchants had been lobbying Congress for years to enact legislation
capping swipe fees.138 And quixotic as the quest for blunt price
regulation usually is, in the United States, these merchants had
recently enjoyed spectacular success: in 2010, § 1075 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act139
(“the Durbin Amendment”) effectively capped swipe fees on debit
card transactions, and merchant lobbyists wanted to extend rate
regulation to credit cards.140 But when the private antitrust settlements were announced in the Payment Card Cases—
promising merchants the ability to use surcharging to inject
price competition into the market and to discipline swipe fees—
the proponents of legislative rate regulation became alarmed.
Durbin’s senior counsel wrote to the head of the National Retail
Federation (NRF) (the de facto leader of the objecting merchants’
group) and warned darkly that the proposed settlements will
“foreclose the prospect” of rate-capping legislation and that the
“efforts to have Congress rein in credit-card swipe fees will be imperiled” unless the objectors manage to derail the settlements.141

138 See, for example, Swipe Fees: Latest News (NRF), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6WS
-JDPS (“[The National Retail Foundation] has led the retail industry’s fight over swipe
fees for a number of years, seeking legislation that would introduce transparency and
competition that would bring fees down to a reasonable level.”). The National Retail Federation was a strong objector in the MDL 1720 settlement, arguing that the settlement
“fail[ed] to reform the cartel-like system” established by Visa and MasterCard because it
allowed “fees [to] be passed along to consumers in the form of a surcharge” rather than to
be absorbed by the networks. Id.
139 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 2068–74 (2010), codified at 15 USC § 1693o-2.
140 On July 21, 2010, Congress passed legislation to address the rise of debit card
fees. Sponsored by Illinois Senator Richard Durbin, the Durbin Amendment directs the
Federal Reserve to establish a rate cap for debit card swipe fees—a cap that the Fed has
since set at a level that is well under half the level of swipe fees applicable to credit card
transactions (which are unregulated). See 15 USC § 1693o-2; Declaration of Alan S.
Frankel, Ph.D., In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil
Action No 11-MD-02221, *13–14 (EDNY filed Apr 15, 2014).
141 Matt Townsend and Dakin Campbell, Durbin Sees Visa Accord Thwarting Push
to Cap Card Fees (Bloomberg, Aug 13, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/NX3V-LDY6.
See also Zywicki, Consumers Are the Winners in the Visa/Mastercard Antitrust Settlement (cited in note 112) (reporting that Durbin “blast[ed] the . . . settlement” as a “stunning giveaway” to the credit card networks and that he had “tak[en] the extraordinary
step of intervening in a private legal action to lobby retailers to reject the settlement”).
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And indeed, as of this writing, the NRF and its fellow objectors
remain on the warpath.142
Second, there is a story here about private-public complementarity. In the typical coattail class action, private damages
claims follow on the heels of a government-enforcement case.
That is, the private remedy—and the deterrent wallop that it
packs—is cumulative of the public remedy. And the normative
question, identified with Coffee’s scholarship, is whether the
cumulative remedy overdeters. But here, where the private remedy and the public remedy are injunctive, the dynamics are
quite different.
In Amex ASR in particular, the injunctive remedies were
complementary. The proposed class settlement delivered the
right to surcharge credit cards but not the right to do so differentially.143 The DOJ injunction, meanwhile, gave merchants the
right to treat credit cards differentially, but it did not deliver the
right to surcharge.144 Putting the two together, the class settlement provided that if the DOJ were to win at trial, then—but
only then—merchants could surcharge differentially, subject to
certain restrictions.145 This unique structure allowed the parties
to settle what they could and to not be stymied by posturing over
points that would be settled one way or the other in the thenupcoming DOJ trial.
B.

The Private Attorney General and the Public Enforcer

So now back to our questions. Should deference be paid to
agency nonenforcement decisions in the context of remedial
statutes? Coffee suggests that the private attorney general may
sometimes serve as a failsafe against political considerations
that can lead to the underenforcement of important legal
rights.146 And certainly, the facts of Amex ASR bear that concept

142 See Swipe Fees (cited in note 138) (“NRF is still pursuing legislation that would
increase transparency by requiring card companies to clearly disclose the fees charged by
each type of card and boost competition by ending Visa and MasterCard’s cartel-like
practices in setting the fees.”).
143 See Class Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief on Final Approval at *13–14 (cited in note 50).
144 American Express, 88 F Supp 3d at 163.
145 See Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36) (explaining how the DOJ
and class relief would interact to permit a potent form of differential surcharging and
further describing the “bet” on the DOJ: “[i]f DOJ were to win [at trial], the No-Discount
Rule would be rescinded,” while “[i]f DOJ were to lose, my team reasoned, then we would
never have won this point anyway”).
146 See note 125.
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out in spades. But I would go further and reject the argument—
pressed by some defendants147—that private lawyers are subverting prosecutorial prerogatives by pursuing reforms in cases
where the public enforcer has taken a pass. Once we filter out
abusive litigation via Coffee’s reform proposals, there is no clear
rationale for ignoring Congress’s provision of enforcement rights
to private actors based on executive enforcement decisions.148
And certainly, in the Payment Card Cases, the price of deference
to an agency nonenforcement decision would have been to sacrifice the quest for surcharge reform.
To the extent that we are concerned about reform litigation
encroaching on legislative turf in particular, there may not be
much real-world difference between private and public enforcers. The remedies that they achieve are the same, and the turf
that they invade is the same. And in the Payment Card Cases,
the merchant lobbyists and Durbin’s staff could just as easily
have warned that an impending government consent decree imperiled their legislative agenda, as they warned that the private
class action settlements did. The concern, at bottom, is with reform litigation (by whomever) subverting legislation—and not
properly with the private attorney general model.
To be sure, skepticism with the private attorney general model will linger in the context of Coffee’s coattail or follow-on class
actions. But as the Payment Card Cases show, there are many
other models of private-public partnership, and they need not implicate any such skepticism. And here, Coffee and I would add one
more salutary private-public model to the mix. In an earlier work,
I made the argument that, following the Supreme Court’s class
action–killing decisions of recent years, “state attorneys general
147

See note 123.
Any argument that private enforcers ought to yield to decisions by public agencies
must rest on concerns of profit-driven overdeterrence and a related belief that the public
enforcers’ interests are better aligned with the public’s interests. Professor Amanda M.
Rose, for example, makes this argument, asserting that private follow-on class actions
undermine the “non-profit-driven private enforcers[’] [decision] . . . to engage in a form of
discretionary nonenforcement.” Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule
10b-5, 108 Colum L Rev 1301, 1338 (2008). But even this staunch supporter of exclusive
public enforcement acknowledges that the SEC and other agencies may be subject to “political whims,” “behavioral biases,” “laxity and inefficiency,” and resource restraints. Id
at 1340–41. See also Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 227 n 25 (cited in note 5) (“Although the
public prosecutor lacks any profit motive that might lead him to bring weak or marginal
cases for their nuisance value, a prosecution can be motivated by ideological, political,
and careerist motives, and it is an open question as to which set of perverse incentives is
more dangerous.”).
148
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[should] make broad use of their parens patriae authority . . . to
represent the interests of their citizens in the very consumer,
antitrust, wage-and-hour, and other cases that have long provided the staple of class action practice.”149 And to tackle these
complex cases, state attorneys general should retain private
class action lawyers with serious “expertise in originating, investigating, and prosecuting class actions, as well as financing
them.”150 In Entrepreneurial Litigation, Coffee expands on this
theme of the “semi-private attorney general” (p 195). Observing
that the private attorney general has often been “much more effective than public enforcement” in extracting significant monetary settlements (p 174), Coffee suggests that “the entrepreneurial energy of the plaintiff’s bar [could] be harnessed” by the
public attorney general (p 175).151 As Coffee posits, this form of
private-public partnering would “add teeth to public enforcement,” allowing regulators to bring more and bigger cases than
their budgets currently allow (p 175). And the combination
would provide oversight of class actions by public agencies,
which are “better able to monitor the private attorney general
than can private clients” (p 175).152
III. WHEN REALISM MET FORMALISM
As the third discomfort zone, I have identified a sort of frustration that jurists encounter when their normative intuitions
about how lawyers ought to conduct the business of litigation conflict with the practical, on-the-ground realities of complex, multiparty litigation. As Professor Coffee reminds us, lawyer-driven
149 Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U Chi L Rev 623, 630 (2012). See also id at 660
(“Parens patriae suits are not subject to Rule 23 or contractual waiver provisions, and so
avoid the majority of impediments to contemporary class actions.”).
150 Id at 630. See also id at 669 (observing that, politics aside, “there is little to stop
state AGs from engaging private law firms on a contingent fee basis to pursue claims in
parens patriae on behalf of injured state residents,” so long as the attorneys general retain “total control over all key decision making”).
151 See also Coffee, 42 Md L Rev at 226 (cited in note 5) (asserting that the private
attorney general may be both more efficient than governmental machinery and more
consistent, in that it is immune from changes such as vacillating political will or the vagaries of the public-budget process).
152 In commenting on Coffee’s “semi-private attorney general” concept, Rakoff pointed to an additional benefit: that government agencies employing private lawyers to bring
securities enforcement actions would enjoy the political latitude to “direct that more attention be paid to pursuing individuals,” such as executives who actually committed the
alleged misconduct, thereby packing a greater deterrent wallop. Rakoff, The Cure for
Corporate Wrongdoing (cited in note 120).
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class litigation has never fit comfortably with the fundamental
assumptions that our legal system makes about the role of lawyers, including the premise that “clients, not their attorneys,
should define litigation objectives.”153 As such, Coffee observes,
ethical firestorms are bound to erupt over the conduct of private
attorneys who “wield[ ] a degree of public power, but [are] motivated by powerful economic incentives, and yet subject to only
limited accountability” (p 2).
Bracing themselves against Coffee’s classic critique that
they do not represent “real” clients who perform a meaningful
monitoring function, class action lawyers go to great lengths to
project the appearance of traditional attorney-client relationships. But, of course, the relationships are different—and the
day-to-day activities of class counsel in large, sprawling cases often bear little resemblance to the conventional paradigm.154 The
class lawyer’s activities can look more like those of a shadowy
diplomat, engaging in constant temperature-taking and ideafloating in order to broker viable deals among willing players in
opposing camps. Indeed, it is hard to see how complex, multiparty
settlements could occur without these sorts of communications.
The essential tug-of-war here is between realism and formalism. On one side stands a pragmatic philosophy concerned with
the reality of how complex deals are closed, a realism emblemized
by Coffee’s tireless inquiry into what entrepreneurial lawyers actually do and why they do it. And on the other side stands a formal philosophy concerned with preserving a traditional conception of how lawyers behave, a formalism that looks to ex ante
rules to ensure fidelity to that traditional form. This tug-of-war
plays out in dramatic fashion in the Payment Card Cases.
A.

Amex ASR and the Collusion Theory

As discussed above, some of the nation’s largest
megamerchants were committed to stopping settlement of the
Payment Card Cases at all costs. These objectors lost round one,

153 Coffee, 86 Colum L Rev at 677 (cited in note 117). See also Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 6 (cited in note 7) (“[T]his notion of the lawyer as an entrepreneur is
normatively troubling to many, and it cannot be easily reconciled with traditional legal
ethics, which views the attorney as an agent and insists that the client is entitled to
make all significant litigation decisions.”).
154 See, for example, Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 28 (cited in note 7) (observing that the adoption of the class action device “changed the fundamental relationship between lawyers and their clients in plaintiff’s litigation in the United States”).
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as the Visa-MasterCard settlement won lower court approval.155
And the objectors looked to be in further trouble as the Amex
ASR settlement moved toward court approval in late 2014. But
then came a thunderbolt from out of the blue: Ravelo’s arrest,
the search of her files, and the dissemination of eighteen thousand pages of materials—including hundreds of personal and
professional e-mails spanning many years with a longtime
friend, Friedman, who was lead counsel for the plaintiffs in
Amex ASR and who was active in negotiating the no-surcharge
reform in MDL 1720. The objectors sensed an opportunity and
moved to derail the settlements.
In Amex ASR, the district court ordered the objectors and
class plaintiffs to simultaneously submit ten-page, doublespaced briefs addressing how, if at all, the disclosed communications should affect the court’s determination of the proposed settlement.156 On the appointed day, Friedman’s class plaintiffs
submitted a conventional legal brief that emphasized the merits
of the proposed settlement and its value to the 3.4 million merchants in the class.157 The various objectors, meanwhile, made
several coordinated submissions asserting that the FriedmanRavelo communications reflected serious misconduct.158 Some objectors alleged an elaborate conspiracy.159 Others suggested
something darker—that Friedman and Ravelo were both criminals hiding behind the Fifth Amendment: “Since Ms. Ravelo has
been charged criminally and both she and Mr. Friedman have

155 See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 986 F Supp 2d 207, 213–14 (EDNY 2013). The class settlement provided for
(1) “[t]he creation of two cash funds totaling up to an estimated $7.25 billion (before reductions for opt-outs)”; (2) “Visa and MasterCard rule modifications to permit merchants
to surcharge on Visa- or MasterCard-branded credit card transactions at both the brand
and product levels”; (3) “[a]n obligation on the part of Visa and MasterCard to negotiate
interchange fees in good faith with merchant buying groups”; (4) “[a]uthorization for
merchants that operate multiple businesses under different ‘trade names’ or ‘banners’ to
accept Visa and/or MasterCard at fewer than all of its businesses”; and (5) “[t]he lockingin of the reforms in the Durbin Amendment and the DOJ consent decree with Visa and
MasterCard, even if those reforms are repealed or otherwise undone.” Id at 217.
156 See Order re: Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221
(EDNY filed Apr 30, 2015).
157 See Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to Question Number Two at *1
(cited in note 111).
158 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *7–9, 13 (outlining the arguments for why
Freidman’s interactions with Ravelo constituted “egregious conduct”).
159 See Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Response to Question Number Two at *3–4
(cited in note 111).
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criminal attorneys representing them, the ability to examine
this issue is unlikely.”160
In the early evening of the day that the briefs were due, the
court issued an extraordinary and unprompted order directing
that neither side would be permitted to file responsive papers.161
In other words, whatever allegations were made or charges levied against Friedman by the objectors, he and his team would be
foreclosed from responding, denying, or explaining their conduct.
Friedman has since written that his team “did not anticipate,”
and could not have foreseen, the “distorted narrative that the
objectors would wring out of the 18,000-page record,” and he has
complained that he had no opportunity to rebut the “incredible
allegations” made by the objectors.162 According to Friedman, the
objectors’ intentions were to “goad[ ] the [court] to latch onto the
familiar narrative of a plaintiffs’ class action lawyer selling out
his clients’ interests.”163 If Friedman is correct, the goading
worked: the court rejected the settlement just days after shutting down the briefing. And the court did not base its decision on
an evaluation of the proposed relief; instead, the court rejected
the Amex settlement because it found class counsel’s conduct so
contrary to traditional notions of legal professionalism that it
could not countenance approval.164
So what was the conduct that the objectors alleged and that
the court found so abhorrent that it warranted scrapping a settlement that sought to provide substantial benefits to 3.4 million
Amex-accepting merchants in the United States?
The nub of the collusion theory—advanced by the objectors
and uncritically accepted by the district court—was that Friedman
shared information with Ravelo in a bid to induce Visa and
MasterCard to structure their settlements with a “level playing
160

Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36).
See Scheduling Order, In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221 (EDNY filed July 28, 2015) (“The court is in receipt
of the supplemental memoranda filed today by [certain objectors] regarding . . . communications exchanged between Gary Friedman and Keila Ravelo. . . . No other related
submissions will be permitted by any other parties or objectors.”).
162 Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36).
163 Id.
164 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *11:
161

[T]he court need not, and does not, reach the merits of these aforementioned
objections today, because it concludes that the improper and disappointing
conduct of Co-Lead Class Counsel Gary B. Friedman has fatally tainted the
settlement process. The procedural unfairness and failure of adequate representation . . . requires disapproval of the Settlement.
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field” clause, thereby setting the stage for Amex to later settle
on a parity-surcharging basis.165 According to the court, this
structure served to insulate all three networks from “differential
surcharging.”166
In support of this theory, the court pointed to three areas of
communication. First, the court identified seven documents that
Friedman shared with Ravelo, allegedly in violation of a protective order and in an effort to influence MasterCard’s settlement.167
Second, the judge pointed to “email discussions and outlines regarding 1720 MDL settlement negotiations, status, strategy, and
proposed provisions.”168 By these communications, the theory
holds, Friedman sought to steer defendants to include the level
playing field provision and pave the way for Amex to settle on a
parity basis. And third, the court was perturbed by numerous
communications between Friedman and Ravelo after the MDL
1720 settlement that related to the Amex ASR settlement.169 In
general, the court was struck by Friedman and Ravelo’s relationship, which over the years had included family vacations, discussions of investment opportunities, and personal loans.170 The
judge was especially alarmed at their close communications regarding the Amex ASR settlement negotiations, pointing out that
“Friedman consulted Ravelo at what appears to be every step
along the way.”171 The court reasoned that Friedman’s ability to
be a zealous advocate for the class was compromised by his “collaboration with counsel for MasterCard, an entity with interests
divergent to those of the class,” and that “there [was] reason to be
concerned he was not acting solely in the class’s interests.”172
Friedman saw things differently. Complaining that he never
had an opportunity to address these charges in court—and unable

165 Id at *5, 11. Under the level playing field clause in MDL 1720, a merchant may
surcharge Visa and MasterCard transactions only if it also surcharges Amex transactions. Under parity surcharging, a merchant may surcharge Amex transactions only if it
also surcharges Visa and MasterCard transactions. The allegation was that Friedman
got Visa and MasterCard to agree to the level playing field clause to pave the way for
settling with Amex on a parity-surcharging basis. Id at *11.
166 Id at *17.
167 Id at *13–16.
168 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *15.
169 Id at *18.
170 Id.
171 Id at *15.
172 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *17.
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to appeal the decision173—Friedman published an open letter,
arguing that the entire collusion theory was illogical for several
reasons. First, he noted, each of the seven allegedly confidential documents that the judge identified was transmitted only
after MasterCard settled and thus could not have influenced
MasterCard’s settlement.174
Second, Friedman argued that the “negotiation e-mails” he
sent to Ravelo were part and parcel of legitimate negotiations—
a process that, to Friedman’s mind, involved sharing strategic
thinking with the adversary in these serious and complex cases.175 According to Friedman, he worked to “help forge approvable deals in cases with multiple players and agendas.”176 That
“work entailed no shortage of sidebars, and it required relationships of trust between individual lawyers in opposing camps.”177
Moreover, far from scheming to implement a level playing
field provision in MDL 1720 to pave the way for a paritysurcharging resolution in Amex ASR, the level playing field provision was not Friedman’s innovation at all; rather, according to
all parties to the settlement, it was thrust on the litigants by the
mediators, and, indeed, Friedman led the charge to get rid of
it.178 Further, the judge was mistaken in his characterization of
173 The court’s order dated August 4, 2015, dismissed Friedman as lead counsel,
provisionally decertified the proposed settlement class, and invited the remaining lawyers to re-present an untainted settlement. Id at *21. Friedman had no standing to appeal the rejection under Rule 23(f), as it was not a final judgment. Further, I believe any
attempt to appeal the lead counsel ruling under Rule 23(g) might have been harmful to
the class, as the interests of class members before this particular district judge were
clearly not best served with this particular lead counsel.
174 Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36). Friedman acknowledged
sharing with Ravelo, in this post-MasterCard-settlement time frame, a handful of documents covered by a protective order—mostly court papers that he should have transmitted only in redacted format. Id. Friedman did not dispute that these transmissions likely
amounted to a violation of the protective order, but he contended that the violation was
“inconsequential” and “technical” because in briefs and accompanying documents filed
with the court under seal, the defendant networks and banks averred that Ravelo never
shared these documents with anyone on the defense side; she had agreed to be bound to
confidentiality, like any consultant. Id.
175 See id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See Class Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Rule 60 Motions to Vacate Judgment, In re
Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action
No 05-MD-01720, *24–29 (EDNY filed Sept 1, 2015). As the defendants in MDL 1720 put
it: “Objectors assert that in 2011 Mr. Friedman caused the level playing field provision to
be part of the Settlement so that he could then manipulate the American Express settlement to include ‘parity surcharging.’ Not true.” Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Objectors’ Motion to Vacate Judgment, In re Payment Card Interchange
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the settlement terms: the Amex ASR settlement in fact permitted differential surcharging, and not just parity surcharging, as
discussed above.179 If the conspiracy was aimed at achieving a
pure parity deal, it failed miserably.
Third, as for communications with Ravelo regarding the
Amex settlement well after MasterCard had settled, Friedman
argued that, protective order violations aside, there was nothing
wrong with these communications.180 As a defense-side lawyer
with fifteen years of directly on-point experience under her belt,
Ravelo was a useful confidante, benefiting Friedman and, by extension, his clients.181
Additionally, Friedman alleged that the court misstated
facts in order to portray him as a lawyer selling out his clients’
interests. According to Friedman’s open letter, documents relied
on by the court show that Friedman had demanded a “huge f’ing
number” for class damages—before Italian Colors, when damages were still on the table.182 In the decision, however, the judge
wrote that Friedman, in settling the injunctive case, demanded
this “huge” number for attorney’s fees—a withering allegation of
moral bankruptcy, in the world of entrepreneurial lawyers.183
Similar or worse allegations abound in the report submitted by
the 7-Eleven objectors’ questionable ethics expert, albeit in
somewhat more cartoonish language.184

Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 05-MD-01720, *1
(EDNY filed Sept 1, 2015). The defendants went on to point out that the clause originated from their negotiations with the DOJ and was then adopted by the mediators, all before Friedman became involved in the settlement negotiations. Id at *1–3.
179 See text accompanying notes 132–45 (discussing the interaction between the
DOJ relief and the proposed settlement).
180 Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36).
181 See id (“In the years following the MDL 1720 settlement, I consulted Ravelo regarding the settlement process, the approval process and possible individual merchant
arbitrations, among other things. . . . She brought a deep and unique understanding of
how the GCs of large payment card networks think.”).
182 Id.
183 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *15.
184 Without reviewing any of the pleadings in the case—indeed, without even reviewing the terms of the settlements—the expert, retired Professor Roy D. Simon of
Hofstra University School of Law, pronounced that Friedman was a “double agent” and
a “turncoat,” “representing the plaintiff merchant classes by day and the defendant
MasterCard by night” and giving “aid and comfort to the enemy.” Exhibit 1: Declaration
of Professor Roy D. Simon, Jr., In re American Express Anti-steering Rules Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No 11-MD-02221, *5–6 (EDNY filed July 29, 2015).
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I do not pretend to be neutral or unbiased here.185 But the
evidence suggests that a respected federal judge was successfully goaded to latch onto a “lawyer sells out client” story even
though it was contravened by all of the known facts. Which raises the question of why—an inquiry that surely holds implications for my thesis. What lessons can be drawn from all this
about our enduring discomfort with entrepreneurial lawyers?
B.

The Clash between Realism and Formalism

One take on the collision between Friedman and Judge
Garaufis is that it is a proxy war for the conflict between realism
and formalism. By realism, I have in mind the philosophy that
Coffee practices in his writing, particularly in Entrepreneurial
Litigation. His judgments are informed by the practical realities
of lawyering.186 Coffee is tireless in trying to understand what
entrepreneurial lawyers actually do and why they do it. To understand actions, he wants to understand interests. Motivations
are everything; labels mean little. And when ethical questions
arise, Coffee’s question is always: Who was harmed and how? In
discussing the case of famed securities class action lawyer Mel
Weiss, who was prosecuted in 2008 for making side payments to
figurehead class action clients, Coffee’s question is pointed:
“[E]ven if the[ ] behavior was sleazy and the pattern of misconduct long-standing, the question remains: who was really injured by the payments to professional plaintiffs?” (p 76). And he
digs until he finds satisfactory (if surprising) answers—in the
case of Milberg LLP, Coffee identifies rival law firms as parties
harmed by the side payments (pp 76–77). At any rate, the question for Coffee is actual harm: the effects of actions on interests
in the real world.
On the other side of the spectrum is what I am calling formalism. Judgments in this realm are based on ex ante rules or precepts.187 When written rules exist, the formalist is at his happiest—relieved of bothering with an after-the-fact inquiry into how
a person’s actions may have affected the real-world interests of
185 See text accompanying note 34 (disclosing the relevant relationships with the
parties).
186 See, for example, Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 22–23 (cited in note 7)
(discussing the practical origins of the so-called American rule against fee-shifting).
187 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509, 510 (1988) (“At the heart of
the word ‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking
according to rule.”).
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other parties.188 When rules do not exist, the formalist relies on a
sort of intuition to tell him what the ex ante rule would be if
there were a rule.189 Whatever else these intuitions may draw
on, they are surely informed by a platonic form of traditional
lawyering, in which one lawyer represents one client and negotiates against one adversary.
The work of contemporary class action lawyers in complex
cases—the shadowy work of “forg[ing] approvable deals” with
“multiple players and agendas”—bumps into these formal precepts.190 For instance, Friedman regularly generated memoranda
and discursive e-mails that he sent to his team regarding positions and ideas on rules-reform issues that cut across all three
networks in both sets of cases, and he regularly sent this thinking along to various co-counsel and sometimes opposing counsel
as well, including Ravelo.191 Friedman defended this practice—
forwarding sent e-mails, often sprinkled with comments—as an
efficient way to communicate.192 The court saw it differently.
Friedman’s e-mails and memoranda to his team were attorney
work product, in formal terms, and his sharing them was seditious leaking.193 One person’s collaborative attempts at problemsolving are another person’s collaboration, in the Vichy sense of
the word.
As I said earlier, this case gives us a rare backstage pass, a
chance to observe in real time the reaction of a traditional and
well-respected jurist—albeit under stress test conditions fomented by uniquely powerful and motivated objectors—to some
of the below-the-surface practices of entrepreneurial lawyers in
complex cases. One can only imagine the reaction if other aspects of contemporary class practice were on display in similarly
candid e-mails. I have in mind, for example, e-mails concerning
the favor-trading deals that are often made in arranging for
188 See id (“Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their ‘ruleness’ precisely by
doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker
factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.”).
189 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum L Rev 799, 801 (1941) (observing that, even in the absence of a rule, judges should consider what rule might be
desirable to ensure that parties perform in a particular manner).
190 Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *14 (“Friedman was bound to keep confidential,
and agreed not to disclose to third parties, any work product or confidential information
of the [individual merchant plaintiffs] shared with Friedman. His emails to Ravelo violated those agreements.”).
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class leadership,194 or e-mails regarding the operation of documentreview mills, in which the difference between treating the reviewer as an expense (like a photocopying vendor) or a lodestargenerating associate may determine the financial viability of the
case.195 Or consider case funding, in which entrepreneurial lawyers
in complex commercial cases often tap equity capital from wealthy
tort lawyers, litigation-finance operations, or even British insurance companies.196 Private e-mail communications on these sorts
of issues—especially if they shared the irreverent and profane
tenor of the Friedman-Ravelo e-mails197—would surely offend traditional judicial sensibilities, stretching and perhaps breaching
the boundaries of what courts recognize as the practice of law.
In a formalist fashion, the court’s reaction to the FriedmanRavelo e-mails does not ask what the effects of the lawyers’ actions were on actors in the real world. The court did not engage
in an analysis of Friedman’s motivations or of the real interests
of the parties, nor did it engage in the Coffee-esque inquiry of locating real harm:
Whether Friedman exchanged confidential and/or privileged
materials with Ravelo and consulted with her regarding
these actions for financial reasons, out of personal loyalty,
due to a misplaced sense that her advice would in fact benefit the merchant class and was not improper, and/or for

194 See, for example, Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation at 67–68 (cited in note 7) (discussing favor trading, egregious overstaffing, coalition building, “featherbedding,” and “logrolling practices” common among class counsel in brokering lead counsel positions).
195 See, for example, Gilles and Friedman, 155 U Pa L Rev at 147–51 (cited in note 1)
(examining the traditional business model for lawyers in class action lawsuits).
196 See, for example, Rachel M. Zahorsky, Third-Party Litigation Funding Picks Up
as UK Investors Eye US Cases (ABA Journal, June 4, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/FKE5-KJS3 (discussing the entrance of UK-based litigation-finance investors into the US market, potentially including the class action market); Elizabeth
Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 NYU L Rev 1273,
1298–1300 (2012) (discussing alternative litigation financing of cases involving the drug
fen-phen and other mass tort litigations).
197 For example, Friedman e-mailed Ravelo a term sheet of the Amex settlement
three days before it was made public with a note “Burn after reading.” Amex ASR, 2015
WL 4645240 at *13. He also e-mailed Ravelo an unredacted copy of the class’s reply brief
to those objecting to the class settlement with the note “hahahahahaha.” Id. As to the
latter, Friedman said he was merely offering “insincere condolences” because the “Miami
Heat had that day lost LeBron James back to Cleveland.” Friedman, Friedman Open
Letter (cited in note 36). The court noted these infractions multiple times in its denial of
the class settlement and seemed more perturbed by their tenor than by their content.
Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *13–17.
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some other reason(s), is something this court cannot currently, and need not, determine.198
Friedman’s response challenges precisely this formalism,
saying that “[i]t was a terrible mistake for the Court not to inquire into the reason for my actions, once they were called into
question.”199 Friedman frames the conflict, almost explicitly, as
one between Coffee’s realism and the court’s formalism: “If Judge
Garaufis wants to argue that it does not matter whether my confidential consultation with Ravelo helped the class . . . I’d expect
him to point to some hard-and-fast rule that says ‘even if it helps
your clients, you can’t have communications like x, y or z.’” 200
CONCLUSION
So, can Professor Coffee rescue the private attorney general? I agree with him that the abusive-litigation problem, as he
sets it up, is the core problem posed by contemporary class action litigation. One side of the class action debate obsesses over
the abusive-litigation problem, while the other side obsesses
over the doctrinal devastation that has been wrought by judicial
overreactions to that problem (I know that I do). As for Coffee’s
prescriptions, I will not put my partisan credentials on the line
by endorsing a loser-pays system anytime soon, but I take his
point—and I would be genuinely interested to see specific proposals for the alignment of incentives and for how to make “the
merits . . . matter more” (p 122).
But the assumption of public-enforcement-like powers by selfnominated private lawyers will continue to drive a “who the heck
are you” type of skepticism, even if the case inventory of the class
action bar is cleansed of abusive litigation. The nets of Coffee’s
“bottom fishers” may empty out, but discomfort abounds. Objections to the arrogation of power by majority groups and the usurpation of public functions will not soon abate, although the concrete problems that they pose seem solvable with thoughtful
consideration. Where I am less sanguine is in the realm of perspective and disposition; I fear that the attitudinal residuum of
our decades-long policy debates consigns us to conflict.

198

Amex ASR, 2015 WL 4645240 at *18.
Friedman, Friedman Open Letter (cited in note 36).
200 Id (“[I]f some exogenous rule of ethics is so very compelling that it warrants depriving 3.4 million U.S. merchants of meaningful tools . . . then I think it is incumbent
upon a judge to write a decision explaining what that rule might be.”).
199

